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OUTLINES OF THE FUTURE

*World Organization
Emerging from the War*

BY

HENRI BONNET

1943

WORLD CITIZENS ASSOCIATION

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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FOREWORD

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THIS study is subsequent to two others which were published in 1942 on the subject of the United Nations organization, their principles and policies, what they are, and what they should become.

A year and a half have elapsed since the creation of the United Nations. It is now possible to measure more adequately the scope and consequences of Inter-Allied cooperation, and to see in what direction it should develop during and after the war.

1. The machinery to implement the cooperation of the United Nations, and the fields in which it operates are constantly expanding under the pressure of war. Such cooperation has already produced results of worldwide importance. Other desired developments should be realized.

2. Many of the needs to be fulfilled now will not disappear at the end of the war. Those bodies entrusted with the task of fostering collaboration during hostilities will, in many cases, be able to assume new duties consistent with the needs of peacetime reconstruction.

3. Therefore, the machinery for United Nations cooperation will not have to start building from the ground up when victory is won. Its present systems can provide a solid basis for future development. They will, however, have to be modified to correspond in function

to the purposes for which they will be retained. They then will form an important part of the complete framework of international cooperation. Other desired developments should and will be realized before the war is over.

HENRI BONNET

Chicago,
June 1943

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CHAPTER I

WAR AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE

FEVERISH preparations for the decisive battles to come are going on all over the world. The Axis Powers are trying to turn all the resources of the conquered lands against the Allies. The Nazis claim that they are making war in the name of, and for, Europe. Their real aims are well-known to the submerged peoples. Even though the enemies dominate the lands, they have not yet conquered the people's spirit and souls. But by the use of forced labor, looting and terror, the Nazis are adding part of Europe's industrial power to that of Germany. The Japanese, on the other side of the globe, are doing their best to utilize as completely as possible the wealth of the conquered countries in Southern Asia, even though they are largely prevented from doing so by continuous Allied pressure on their long lines of battle and of communication.

Outside the Axis citadels, there is the Free World where an immense superiority of resources is also being enlisted in the fight against the aggressor nations. To pool their strength, the United Nations have created, in the midst of war, and under the leadership of those most powerfully equipped, a system of collaboration

such as has never before existed. The geography alone of the worldwide war often makes such cooperation physically difficult, and prevents the United Nations from acting as a compact unit on the battlefields. Other difficulties of a political nature present themselves. There is more integration, however, in this common effort than any that alliances ever before produced.

The present war, moreover, broke out after a period in which the nations of the world had conducted a great experiment in international collaboration. Methods and bodies had been established to regulate relations between them, and many achievements had been effected. Causes of the final failure of the League to preserve peace are well known and it is largely to replace the lack of solidarity between peace-loving nations in the past that they now seek the closest solidarity in war.

LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE PAST

It is to be hoped that under the present circumstances, the ageless problem of drawing lessons from war and its resultant changes will be presented in a different light. The pattern of a new world is emerging before our eyes during the struggle itself. Although this war is causing a violently destructive break in the evolution of contemporary nations towards new relationships, it should accelerate, through Allied victory, the pace of such an evolution in the direction of a new and cooperative world.

It is commonly known that wars of the past have had a large part in shaping the destinies of nations. External danger was often the reason for separate communities' joining in larger units, even though eventually it was the cultural and spiritual affinities and traditions which forged indestructible bonds of national homogeneity between those groups. Nations have been destroyed by victorious enemies. But many others have been born through the defeat of a common conqueror.

Despotism and conquest by force will be defeated this time. Can it be hoped that a new era may arise from the destruction?

All modern wars have been fought to destroy or to maintain the status quo ante. Axis propaganda, in the interval between the two wars, made great use of the argument that the "have" nations wanted to prevent any change in the existing order. That propaganda thus gained considerable influence in many countries. It was too often forgotten that in Europe the conquered populations of today did not so much defend the status quo as fight against the ghost of the status quo ante 1914, when many of them were under the yoke of the Germans or of their Allies, notably in Central and Eastern Europe. When oppression is overthrown, it is natural that the peoples which were unwillingly under its ruthless laws want to recover their independence and to take precautions that the aggressor does not return.

Defensive wars are those fought to protect rights

when they are attacked or immediately threatened. In spite of the steps taken by the Free World to unite solidly so as to win victory, the present war was intended to preserve rights of national independence. Today, however, national independence must be reconciled with the interdependence of all nations, in every field, particularly that of security. That is proved even by the methods of waging a global war. Victory must preserve the results of the present inter-allied solidarity for generations to come.

HOW COALITIONS LOSE PEACE

There are many examples of nations and coalitions of nations which lost the opportunity that victory held out to them of making a lasting peace. Very often, in modern times especially, the cause which provoked such errors was consideration of the past rather than of the future by those governments responsible for peace.

It is well known that the consequences of the revolutionary period which began in 1789 with the first outbreak of the French Revolution and lasted until 1815 through the whole of the Napoleonic Wars, were entirely misinterpreted or willfully ignored by many of the negotiators of Vienna. They did not understand what new aspirations towards freedom, political liberties, and national independence had been carried under the Tri-color to various people in Europe. Resistance by the dominated people to the conquest of

Napoleon had not prevented the deep penetration of such influences. The French people themselves were not to forget their own struggle for freedom. Moreover, the destruction of war, the continental blockade which had stimulated the growth of new techniques, new industries and the creation of new trade currents, the necessity of feeding and equipping larger armies than ever before, had profoundly modified the conditions of life in all Europe. New classes arose, and it was possible to discern the first appearance of a new economic era.

An urgent preoccupation, however, of the governments in the victorious coalition was to prevent any new outburst of the revolutionary ideas. They feared them more than anything else. They did their best to force the 19th century back to the pre-Revolutionary days of the 18th. And the Holy Alliance was created for that purpose, as well as to maintain the territorial order established in 1815. Liberals who had taken part in the settlement were soon to lose all influence in the governments, while liberalism itself was to disappear almost completely from the continent.

The consequences were, that much of the new century's history was devoted to destroying the results of the Vienna Treaty, even though the territorial settlements that a superior force had imposed on Europe lasted almost intact for some forty years. During this period, various revolutionary forces were at work continuously and later on, one by one, the main fea-

tures of the Treaty itself were to disappear in the course of all the wars which prevented European peace from being more than a precarious balance of power.

No coalition of Powers, however strong it may be, can find a solution to the difficulties which caused the battles they fought, if they do not base their decisions on the will of the people they have led to victory or do not have the full support of public opinion.

It may be said that some of the deepest desires of the people were not given sufficient consideration at the end of the first World War, even though some of the lessons of the past were undoubtedly understood. An effort was made to satisfy the longing for national independence which had been the essential feature of European politics during the long period which preceded the war. At the same time there was hope of establishing new methods of collaboration between various nations and of setting up a system for the prevention of war by the creation of the League of Nations.

But the solidarity between the Allies in their struggle against the Central Powers was not retained. No real powers were given to the League of Nations by which it could bind its many member States solidly together. Failing to be universal, the League was not supported by regional organizations which could have crushed the growth of narrow economic nationalism and have prevented war from starting in the Pacific area or in

Europe. The intense desire of the people for military security was not satisfied as it should have been, notably at the beginning, by the maintenance of a military system for the prevention of aggression.

Deep aspirations for greater unity among the free people of Europe and for their increased welfare, notably through agrarian and various other social reforms, were likewise not taken advantage of to the fullest extent. Victory in 1918 was the victory of democracy according to the slogan made popular in the United States. But in that country, as well as in others, there was no profound determination that everything should be done in order that the outcome of the struggle should fulfill the objective for which it was fought—ensuring progress of democracy and universal protection from aggression. In addition, there cannot be democracy today, if justice does not rule in the economic life of the nation, as well as in the granting of political liberties. In Asia, and in large parts of Central Europe, the masses of farmers were not given the social structure they were entitled to enjoy, and that at a time when a violent revolution was being successfully carried on in Russia.

Satisfying such needs and longings would undoubtedly have encouraged the organization of larger economic and political units in Europe, and would have avoided the division of the continent by walls of duties into so many weak countries. It would have heralded a new life for the masses. It could also have granted

more powers to a universal League of Nations so that that body could have gradually reduced national sovereignties to the extent necessary. The League would thus have been given the means of winning the long struggle which was tenaciously and ably conducted for years in Geneva, instead of its being condemned to defeat under the attacks from Naziism and Fascism.

FUTURE TRENDS TOWARDS SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY

New opportunities will again be presented even as a result of this most tragic period and the most serious crisis the world has ever known. In order to take advantage of such possibilities, one essential condition will be to accept new approaches in dealing with the problems of tomorrow, refusing to revive those features of the past which are obviously dead.

Fortunately, the means will exist. It may be that the United Nations during the war will have to function to some extent like the old coalitions of Powers. They constitute an alliance of nations threatened by death, and within their framework there are additional alliances such as the Anglo-Russian; the aim of such alliances is not only to win the war, but also to render impossible any future aggression by the common enemy. The existence of such alliances, however, should not preclude the construction of a new international order later on. If there is one lesson from the last war which will not be forgotten, it is that security

must first of all be carefully preserved. Precautions taken for that purpose by such alliances will certainly not be considered as reviving a dead issue of the past. They will be interpreted as guaranteeing enough time to build a strong peace, and the submerged populations of today will gladly join in such a guarantee.

But the United Nations will have to recognize and satisfy other needs as vital as that of security. Such will be the trend towards implementing, developing and strengthening democratic systems, governments of the people, by the people and for the people. After experiencing the awful destruction brought about by Fascism, the vast majority of the peoples will be convinced that there can be no hope of peace as long as despotism is allowed to exist. President Roosevelt rightly interpreted the thought of the conquered peoples when he said in his broadcast of February 12, 1943 that the United Nations were entitled to tell tyrannical and fascist governments, "Never again."

Democracy will also imply a settlement of the social problems which, in our industrial era, caused fratricidal rivalries to break out before the war in every nation, and allowed Mussolini and Hitler to take advantage of the hidden forces of despair and destruction and to hurl them forward towards world conquest. For the agricultural and industrial workers in Asia and Europe, democracy will mean a struggle against want—a problem requiring solution under various conditions peculiar to different parts of the world.

There will also be the conviction that such high purposes cannot be obtained without developing among nations the elements of unity and understanding, and without founding new political and economic relations upon that need for a closer cooperation, unimpaired by the various barriers which political, intellectual and economic nationalism has erected between peoples.

"Security, Democracy, Unity," could be a motto to replace that which the League of Nations once tried to launch, "Arbitration, Security, Disarmament." It will express broader and deeper hopes.

UNITY AND REGIONAL NEEDS

It is evident that even the most enlightened policy will not immediately determine all the details of international relations everywhere on earth to the end that the unity for which people are struggling can magically be brought about. Profound differences in traditions and situation will raise many regional questions requiring settlement just as much as those of a universal nature.

In Europe, the reorganization of life on a peaceful basis for about five hundred and fifty million people will demand vision, as well as a long and continuous effort. But it may be taken for granted also that it will be the deepest desire of the majority of Europeans to establish a firm basis for European cooperation—of a Europe which will be able to protect itself against the periodical outbreak of war.

The problem of the enemy countries will probably have to be handled by the United Nations for a considerable period, in Europe and in Asia. But in the meantime, a new European structure should be planned under such bodies as those described by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in his speech of March 21, 1943, when he spoke of a European Council. Various parts of the continent, would also have to be reorganized. In Central and Southeastern Europe a strong and vital peace must exist if there is to be security for Russia as well as for the Atlantic nations. Preparatory steps toward confederations in the Danubian Basin and the Balkans, already taken by governments-in-exile, point in the right direction. Real federal systems founded upon a thoroughly democratic constitution and much stronger than the sort of permanent alliance which is commonly called a confederation should, however, be established.

It is to be hoped also that there will be a Western Europe of which Great Britain as well as France will be a component part. The common interest of Russia and the United Kingdom in maintaining mutual friendly relations is not contradictory to the establishment of as complete a union as possible between the nations which will control the Atlantic coasts. The very existence of a continent in which agriculture and industry could be reorganized and in which peace could safely expand, will depend largely upon the organization of such strong pillars of cooperation

among the people of Europe. It is on such a basis that European unity can exist.

In Asia there will also be the problem of a reorganization of inter-Asiatic relations and of raising the standard of living among the populations there. That will be connected very closely with the question of new relationships between the Eastern nations and the rest of the world, especially the United States and various European countries. The question of a "Council of Asia," so designated by Prime Minister Churchill, cannot be separated from the question of peace in the Pacific area and of the existence of a "Council of the Pacific," nor from that of a greater integration in the economic life of people living along the shores of the Indian Ocean.

Such problems are not new. There can hardly be an attempt to solve them by the United Nations during the war. But many declarations of Chinese, European and American leaders indicate that, not only because of difficulties such as the one which arose in India, they are fully aware of the importance of the political, economic and social problems of Asia.

The very fact of mentioning both Europe and Asia and the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, shows also that such problems will have to be settled as parts of one universal problem. More integration in parts of the world which, up to the present time, have been divided by internal quarrels is only a necessary step towards world organization. A Europe which would

be reorganized and would be proceeding towards unity, and yet at the same time, would maintain an antagonistic and indifferent attitude towards the United States and the Americas, would mean a world divided into hostile blocs. Indeed, such a situation would mean that there would no longer be a United Nations, and that the present solidarity in war, between European nations such as Russia and Great Britain, and the United States, would break down after victory, just as a solution of Asiatic difficulties is inconceivable if China and these nations drift apart after the downfall of Japan. Moreover, active participation by the United States in the creation and maintenance of world order will be rightly considered by all other nations as a fundamental condition to the success of their common endeavor.

The United Nations which represent the Free World of tomorrow possess the means of creating conditions which will not allow a return to an impossible past. That is the goal for which this war is being fought. No idea could be more fatal than to consider the United Nations as only a war machine. While creating all kinds of instruments for war, they have also proclaimed new principles of far-reaching scope and consequence, and they must live up to such principles.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION

AIMS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION

IT IS now more than a year since the Allied Powers became United Nations to oppose the Axis Powers and their satellites.

The hope was thus raised of transforming a mere war alliance such as that which had existed so often throughout the past centuries, into something entirely different—fulfilling not only the people's desire for powerful and decisive conduct of the war, but also their deep yearning for a new and stronger relationship between peace-loving nations.

Impatience has often been expressed because the steps taken towards such realization have thus far been rather limited. There is no single political agency representing all the United Nations which is able to make decisions binding upon all of them. Regret has also been expressed to the effect that there is no Supreme Council of the four largest warring nations, namely, Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China.

Such a Council would not solve the question of participation by the other twenty-eight United Nations in the decisions to be taken.¹ The very nature of those criticisms and their apparent contradiction shows first, that a very flexible organization will have to be set up some day, in order to take into consideration both the heavy responsibilities to be borne by some of the United Nations in world affairs and the legitimate concerns of other countries; second, that such complicated problems of international organization cannot be satisfactorily and completely settled during actual hostilities. A provisional organization of the United Nations, adapted to the needs of war, will have to be set up as the first step.

The concept of a Supreme Council of the Big Four—as they are sometimes called—comes from the existence of military actualities; its need being especially felt in the actual conduct of the war. There is no such council, and no general staff of the four nations to plan the strategy for the worldwide battlefronts. Negotiations have to be carried on with Moscow and Chungking after decisions have been reached by the United States and Great Britain, as was demonstrated once again after the Casablanca

¹The French National Committee of General de Gaulle in London has not joined the United Nations, in spite of its being at war with the Axis Powers. French unity has now been realized through a National Committee of Liberation in Algeria. The French contribution to the war is now next in importance to that of the United States, the British Empire, Russia and China. It seems certain that France will join the United Nations which would number thirty-three in that event.

Conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.¹

It does not follow that such a Supreme Council even if set up, should try to settle the political issues which will be subsequently at stake. It is true that all of those four countries are interested in the solution of many important political problems involving the future. But few such problems concern those countries alone. The settlement of long-standing political feuds in Europe will tomorrow, perhaps, still be a most delicate task. That is the common concern, however, of the conquered Europeans of today as much at least as of the free countries. Similar situations will exist in all parts of the world. They are among the underlying causes of the present war, which is the first one to be of really global extent, as all future wars will be if they are allowed to start.

The problem for the allies is not one of making now all the detailed decisions which will prevent the recurrence of such situations. Many immediate tasks, however, must be the responsibility of the United Nations as a whole, for example, the constant strength-

¹Since then, Prime Minister Churchill again met with President Roosevelt in Washington, D. C., May 1943. This was their fifth conference since the beginning of the war. The four others took place: 1) In August 1941, before the United States had declared war, when the President and the Prime Minister met on a warship in the western Atlantic and drew up the Atlantic Charter. 2) In December 1941 two weeks after Pearl Harbor, Mr. Churchill arrived in Washington at which time he addressed the Congress and announced the plan of stopping the enemy during the latter part of 1942. 3) June 1942, again in Washington, where, after the successes of the Germans in Russia and Africa during the summer, the two leaders planned for the offensive strategy of the Allies in the West for the coming season. 4) In January 1943, at Casablanca.

ening of their cooperation against the common enemy; the maintenance and fostering of political solidarity; preparation for the developments to be expected as a result of the progressive liberation of occupied countries; the creation of a nucleus of bodies which, in the future, will allow them to meet the problems of political, material, and moral reconstruction of the world, however extensive the transformations, improvements and enlargements of such bodies will eventually have to be.

DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EXPERIENCE

It is clearly evident that there is on the part of the more influential Allied governments a marked tendency towards proceeding cautiously and along experimental lines only, where organization is concerned. Up to the present time, the trend has been that of meeting immediate difficulties as well as possible, and of filling the needs of the most pressing requirements.

That procedure does not mean, as is sometimes said, that the action of the United Nations, thus far controlled by the most powerful and better equipped countries does not follow an established plan. But first of all comes the clearly-defined and common goal of preventing defeat and ensuring complete victory. Practically all the detailed planning and building up of a United Nations machinery has been aimed towards that goal. No detailed blueprint has been drawn up for future world cooperation, nor, as far as

one can see, is there any immediate inclination to set up such a plan, and still less to carry it out now.

Apart from the dominant preoccupation of immediate efficiency in military operations, there is another determining factor which explains the reluctance of the most influential Allied governments to set up a United Nations machinery responsible for their common political activities, and that is the enormous differences between the immediate and respective burdens of the allied countries. There are daily decisions and actions in which, for instance the Central American Republics are not concerned. Obviously also, in time of war, many problems relating to Europe or to Asia, and often closely connected with questions of strategy, could not be fruitfully discussed by an Assembly or Council of thirty-two nations. Others can be of concern both to several of the United Nations and to friendly countries which are not numbered among them. Such, for example, is the case in Latin America where seven of the Republics have merely broken off diplomatic relations with the enemy.

Such difficulties are real and, in all likelihood, the present process of evolution and empirical development will be continued. What are the prospects that such a process will lead to measures of organization which have lasting value and will be able, later on, to help in constructing a new system of peaceful relations? Recent events indicate that the pressure of circumstance will help the formation of fundamental plans for effective united action towards world unity.

The Functioning of the United Nations System

The fact that the United Nations now function primarily as a war machine has a certain number of consequences both restrictive and creative which must be clearly understood.

I. Those limiting the Allied effort in organization are the following:

A. The legal basis of the present collaboration among the United Nations is as simple as possible. They are bound together by the Declaration of January 1, 1942, which constitutes their only charter. The Declaration pledges all of them to a common ideal as expressed in the Eight Points of the Atlantic Charter. But, the Declaration by United Nations is essentially a pledge of full cooperation against the enemies and a promise not to make a separate armistice or peace with them.

There are no detailed conditions for admission stipulated in the Declaration. The final phrase runs: "the foregoing Declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are or may be rendering material assistance or contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism." At first sight, it would seem that even a nation merely having severed diplomatic relations with any of the Axis Powers could, therefore, ask to join the coalition. Such, however, is not the case. Each signatory government is pledged to "employ its full resources military or economic" against one or all of the

Axis Powers, and that pledge eventually and inevitably means war.

The thirty-two United Nations are those at war. Any additional country which formally declares war against one of the members of the Tripartite Pact can automatically become a member of the Association if it signs the Declaration. Iraq, Abyssinia and Bolivia recently did so as soon as they became belligerents. There is no other condition for admission; there is no vote taken on admission by the other United Nations.

There was even a question for some months as to whether or not some of the Allies would not remain outside the group of the United Nations. Brazil, which declared war against Germany and Italy on August 22, 1942 did not immediately sign the Declaration. It was rumored at that time that its government did not wish to join an organization of which Soviet Russia was a member. Such a refusal to join, if actually caused by such a reason, could have endangered the frail legal structure of the whole body. Russia, however, has been as emphatic as any of her associates in declaring her adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and her devotion to the high ideals of the United Nations. That particular threat of possible discord and abstention, moreover, was dispelled on February 6, 1943, when, after the visit of President Roosevelt on his way back from Casablanca, Brazil became officially a member of the United Nations. They now include all nations which are at war on the

side of the Allies. There could not be a stronger bond. It is so strong, in fact, that legal ties for the purpose of strengthening the United Nations' solidarity can, at first sight, be omitted.

B. The very simplicity of this legal structure has resulted in the lack of legal procedures for the regular functioning of the United Nations. There was no provision made for periodical meetings of United Nations representatives at the time of the signing of the Declaration. The initiative in such a matter would have to be taken by some one of them, very likely the United States Government—as Depositary for the Declaration. In such a case, the Depositary Government will probably seek previous agreement with Great Britain, Russia and China. The Agenda would have to be established after negotiations by officials of the government which takes the initiative in calling the gathering together.

There is no secretariat of the United Nations. There are no councils or committees entitled to act in the name of all of them, even for simple matters or in an advisory capacity.

C. The principal machineries of the United Nations are controlled by those countries which have been able to meet the common needs, notably in matters of production.

The most outstanding of such bodies are the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington which plans the strategy for the United States and Great Britain, and

the five Combined Boards which, under the Chiefs of Staff, deal with all the questions of raw materials, food, industrial production, assignments of ammunition and weapons, and adjust the available shipping to the requirements of the various Allied countries and different theaters of war. Other Combined committees of less importance have recently been created to deal with questions of limited scope, such as ensuring supplies to North Africa or with problems which are not urgent, for example, a combined committee for export trade.

All of these bodies, as is quite well known, are British-American. They must consider the needs of the other United Nations as well, and must work in the interest of all of them. But the contacts between the Combined centers in Washington and the rest of the United Nations have been maintained partly through negotiations with other allied countries in London or in Washington, and partly through exchanging permanent or temporary technical missions between various capitals. That may work as a war system and an efficient one indeed, but must also be considered as of a provisional character.

II. In spite of such limitations, there are also constructive forces at work within the United Nations system:

A. Such combined collaboration as that represented by the bodies established in Washington and London has begun to spread all over the world. In fact, the

needs resulting from the vast extent of the war have led to consideration of regional demands.

The need for such arrangements in the military field is obvious and, from the beginning, regional commands were created to meet it. But production and organized administration are also vitally important in the present war. No system of military command can be separated from the civilian effort supporting it. Organizations which deal with such matters on the various battle fronts are indispensable to the united effort and will continue to be so in greater degree. Important combined centers have already been established in the Middle East at Cairo, and in North Africa. There is other regional collaboration in the field of production such as the Allied Supply Council functioning in Australia in conjunction with the United States, and the Eastern Group Supply Council created by the British following the Economic Conference which met at New Delhi in October 1940. Such cooperation among several United Nations in given areas will gradually extend to the liberated lands during the war itself.

B. The needs and forces which have led to the establishment of an already intricate network of collaboration continue to make their pressure felt. They will necessitate constant additions of new parts in the existing machinery. Certain problems could have been avoided some months ago, but an increasing number will surely have to be faced and settled as the ring

tightens around the Axis forces and the end of war draws near. Striking examples of such a process are now taking shape. There are, for instance, the negotiations for creating a United Nations Relief Agency; the convoking of a Food and Agriculture Conference by the United States; the negotiations between the American and British Treasuries on future steps necessary to stabilize currencies and to devise some sort of organization capable of dealing with the various aspects of these technical and political problems; the arrangements which have been concluded between wheat-producing countries; tomorrow perhaps, negotiations will start that will result in necessary agreements concerning civilian aviation after the war. The solution of many other questions waiting to be settled must come about before the end of the war if there is to be a real peace.

C. Development of the war also makes necessary various decisions of an entirely new character. Some of the difficulties which will have to be understood and controlled were shown in the North African experience. They are of a political nature. All the United Nations will have to see that the seeds of dissension planted by Naziism and Fascism will have to be torn from the earth's soil if the benefits gained from the struggle against international tyranny are to be fully enjoyed and of lasting endurance.

"It is one of our aims as expressed in the Atlantic Charter," said President Roosevelt in his radio address

of February 12, 1943, speaking of North Africa and the future of France, "that the conquered peoples of today will again be the masters of their destiny." That will mean the adoption of a well- and clearly-defined policy to be applied in connection with the liberated countries. The military authorities of occupation must be protected against improvisation. Methods and procedures must be defined in advance so as to allow the people who have been freed from tyranny to restore the legislation they want and to establish provisional—and as soon as possible definite—governments deriving their authority from popular will.

Many other political problems will become urgent and will require preparations, as the end of the war approaches.

D. Even though certain of the bodies and procedures set up for war purposes alone will vanish, it is evident that the need which forced many of those new steps will be of a lasting nature. The facilities which now exist for coping with such permanent needs should render increasing services and should be retained for that purpose after the war.

It would be a great and mistaken illusion to believe that, this time, there will be a clear-cut line of demarcation between war and peace—that on one day all the effects of war will vanish and a liberated and joyful world will proceed triumphantly towards a new destiny. That was supposed to be the glorious outlook for the League of Nations in 1919. That organization

was thrust into a position where it had to start building everything—to construct something strong and permanent on shifting, and sometimes, treacherous soil. It struggled hard and successfully for years, in order to fulfill its tremendous duty, to develop by means of persuasion and negotiation the necessary power for such a great task. The history of the League, and the mistakes committed by the nations in the League, must not be repeated. Whatever has so far been used to save the world from the most deadly perils it has faced in modern times, and which can be turned to good purpose for the future, must be kept to form the solid foundations of a world community.

CHAPTER III

WAR AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

THE need for military security will be the pre-dominant issue for the whole world after fighting is over. In the political field such a need will at first overshadow every other preoccupation.

What use can be made of the "war machinery" of the United Nations in satisfying the ardent hope of the people for safety? Can, and will, such a machinery furnish the basic elements of a system for the efficient and decisive preservation of lasting peace?

The present war for the Allies results from the failure of their previous effort towards collective security. This war is collective security of defense set in motion, but too late, and under the worst possible conditions, after the enemy had had all the time and all the facilities necessary for increasing its striking power to the utmost.

In 1936, when Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland militarily and prepared to dig in on the Siegfried Line, thus rendering mutual help difficult between Western and Central Europe, he was allowed to deal a dangerous blow to any system of European security. In spite of that, at the time of the Munich Agreement and before he took over the arsenal of armaments in

Czechoslovakia, his forces were still inferior to the combined strength—even in aviation—of the Western Powers, of their allies in Central and Southeastern Europe, and of Russia. Enforcement of peace, even at that time, would probably have resulted in less bloodshed than was necessary a year later, even though it would have precipitated a destructive war.

Collective security means, above all, the prevention of attack and the rendering of aggression impossible. Repression to the extent of a full-fledged war should never become necessary.

The failure of collective security was as apparent in the Far East as it was in Europe when not only nothing was done to stop Japan's aggression against China, but all opportunity was given her to prepare her attack on Southern Asia and the United States.

PRESENT TRENDS IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

It is already realized by the leaders of the United Nations that every effort will have to be made to prevent the recurrence of such situations. A broad and general system of collective security is announced in Point Eight of the Atlantic Charter and is a promise subsequently endorsed by every one of the United Nations when they signed the Declaration of January 1, 1942. There have also been numerous references to such a promise in many declarations made by responsible statesmen of the Allied countries. The same aspiration is proclaimed in almost all the political treaties

thus far concluded by several of the United Nations. To take only one example, the Anglo-Russian treaty of May 26, 1942, in Article III, pledges the two contracting parties "to unite with other like-minded states in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period."

But, at the same time, it has been made clear in all such declarations, speeches, agreements, or treaties that there is no inclination among the Allied governments to forget the lessons of the prewar period or indeed the teachings of war itself. Point Eight of the Atlantic Charter makes the disarmament of "nations which threaten or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers," the preliminary and necessary condition for the establishment of security. A system of drastic prevention of war will have to be established before the signatories will "aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments." The entire dissension as to the vital problem of disarmament or security seems to have been definitely solved in the mind of the Allied leaders. The future reduction of military preparations is made entirely dependent upon the establishment of decisive prospects for lasting peace.

The same spirit also inspired additional agreements recently concluded. Here again, we can refer to Article III of the Anglo-Russian Treaty which pledges the two parties to devote their alliance for twenty

years and in as effective manner as possible to the prevention by "all measures in their power," of "a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe." Chinese leaders for their part, have made clear that they also want a practical system of collective security to be established and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices after the war to help maintain peace in Asia and the Pacific area.

All that means that the first steps towards military security will be closely linked to the situation having developed during the war. Collective security will first be the continuation of victory, the maintenance, on a limited scale, of some of the measures which will have made the re-establishment of peace possible.

PERMANENT CONDITIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The military measures thus taken will, of course, have to become as soon as possible a feature—but only one—in a system of new international relations, endowed with a legal structure and provided with adequate institutions. Point Eight of the Atlantic Charter indicates as one high goal of the future that such new international relations must be founded "for realistic as well as for spiritual reasons" on the abandonment of force. That means the settlement of many problems which were the stumbling blocks over which collapsed the protracted efforts of the League of Nations.

A long-range view of such problems could be in-

dedicated: in the military field itself, guarantees will have to be established so that industrial potentialities of nations cannot be turned towards aggression; that possibilities of normal industrial developments are given to underdeveloped nations through the free access to raw materials and a more equal division of work. In the political field, there are many feuds and difficulties which cannot be solved without employing drastic measures which, in many cases, will amount to reduction of the sovereign powers of individual states in favor of regional organizations and of the universal agency representing the community of nations. The Atlantic Charter, moreover, makes clear that such a vast reconstruction must rest upon a recognition of a universal foundation of moral principles for regulating the relations between the various human communities, as is now done between individuals in every one of the civilized nations. In other words, the United Nations in the future will again be confronted with many legal and organizational problems which were not settled before the war.

But, to treat first things first. Their immediate task will be to draw from victory the framework on which to build peace.

PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION AND THE FUTURE OF SECURITY

Just as part of the machinery now working on behalf of the United Nations in the production and distribution of supplies will be able to furnish useful organiza-

tion and procedures for reconstruction work, various intrinsic parts of the military setup can be used to police the world and guarantee the maintenance of peace.

Changes in the size of the forces—and in the distribution of responsibilities among the United Nations, however, will evidently be more drastic in the military field than in any other. Victory will bring the possibility of progressively demobilizing the huge national armies which will have drained the manpower of so many of the United Nations, and at the same time, allow the liberated countries to play their part and assume their share of responsibility in preserving peace. A well-functioning system for the prevention of war, if properly managed, should not require anything comparable in size even to the military forces maintained before the war by European and Asiatic nations, when peace was at best an uncertain and fragile truce. But the framework of the necessary machinery exists now.

General Staff

First, a general staff of the United Nations—a specialized body competent in military matters—will certainly be required after the re-establishment of peace. Such a staff partially exists today and is composed of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and London and the Combined Munitions Assignments Board which, under the Chiefs of Staff, advises on all distribution of munitions to the United Nations according to strategic needs.

A more comprehensive organization will certainly exist during the last phase of the war. Other United Nations already maintain naval and military representatives for liaison purposes with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It may be taken for granted that when the war comes to Continental Europe from the West or South, a closer coordination will have to be formed with the Russian General Staff, and indeed, with the other European armies which will rise against the Germans and Italians. In North Africa, the existing regional command already includes Staffs of the French North African Army and of General de Gaulle's troops. The final onslaught against the Japanese will certainly bring closer collaboration between the various armies striking the last blow at the Empire of the Rising Sun, notably closer understanding with the Chinese. Such a Combined Staff as will then exist, with all its various ramifications in all theaters of war, will, at the same time, have to become fully representative of the United Nations and considerably reduced in number. But it must not disappear and the facilities at its disposal all over the world must be utilized for the establishment of the first organization of security set up by the United Nations.

Strategic Bases

Foundations for such a network are being constantly built up. Strategic bases to meet the threat of the enemy are now established on various continents.

They are equipped with the latest improvements for modern warfare. They are connected by roads of strategic importance and by air routes. They are manned by United Nations troops.

Strategy in time of war consists of assuring security for defense and for attack. The purpose of some of the most important expeditions of the enemy or of ourselves was to ensure the possession of strategic bases in the Central or Southern Pacific, along the coasts of Southern China and of Indo-China, in Singapore, in the Solomon Islands, in West Africa and in the Mediterranean. The map of the war shows clearly what the military structure of worldwide peace should be. The problem will be to decide just what price is to be paid in time of peace for the preservation of such a framework of security and to keep it at the lowest possible level consonant with ample protection.

Such a framework would require the maintenance, under the guarantee of the United Nations, of many of the vital strategic bases which now exist. The present war has demonstrated that the most powerfully equipped bases cannot, in many cases, be defended by a single Power. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that security for one nation very often involves insecurity for one or several of the others. If one nation acquires long range protection for its own frontiers and shores against possible enemy attacks, that fatally means, to other nations, facilities for eventual offensive action against themselves.

Arrangements in the future should be provided so as to remove such a threat to mutual confidence. That does not mean infringement on the administrative rights of the State, nor occupation of territory by a foreign Power. Such collective agreements will have to be limited to military precautions which are rendered necessary by the growing unity of the globe.

There is no doubt that, in the frame of world security, there will be regional agreements for the maintenance of peace in given areas. But the progress of modern warfare and the interdependence of all nations prove that prevention of war is also the common concern of all. Strategic facilities, such as a certain number of military bases in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, should be placed at the disposal of the future political council and of the military staff of the United Nations for the following essential purpose: that of keeping open the roads over which the combined strength of the United Nations must be able to move if necessary for the decisive prevention of any potential aggressions.

INTERNATIONAL FORCES

At the end of the war, a great superiority of armaments of all sorts will be in the hands of the powerful warring nations. That will mean a greater share of moral and material responsibility for those nations, but it will certainly be possible to obtain also a division of the burden between them and their less favored Allies.

Indeed, such considerations are already indicated at a time when many of the United Nations are deprived of the largest part of their military power. Pilots and crews of the European free forces are fighting under a unified command with the R.A.F. on the Western Front; they employ the same material as that of the British airmen. The conditions of such cooperation are established in agreements concluded with their governments or leaders. Important European units also fight side by side with the armies and navies of their more powerful Allies. They are only a vanguard of the popular armies which will rise in Europe tomorrow.

The international police force of the future will very likely be organized on the basis of permanent collaboration between troops of the United Nations which will be under a common command and placed at the disposal of political bodies possessing the necessary authority. It will not be made up of units in which many nationalities are represented. All the elements of such a United Nations military set-up already exist.

A first practical duty will devolve upon the United Nations immediately after victory, namely the execution of the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter and in other treaties for the complete disarmament of the aggressor nations. The strict suppression of their armed forces and the surrendering of their weapons cannot be accomplished without corresponding measures of occupation.

It is difficult to say at the present time just how long the policing of the former enemies will be necessary. The initial demobilization of their forces will require considerable supervision and a larger number of enforcing agents and soldiers than for any subsequent action. Demobilization will, in such a case, include suppression of war industries, and destruction of fortifications. But close supervision will also be required afterwards. The question of industrial potentialities for war, strongly insisted upon by military experts of the League of Nations, as early as 1922, will notably have to be settled.

It is certain, moreover, that the neighboring nations will not feel in complete security until a profound transformation of the Japanese, Nazi, and Fascist regimes, equivalent to a deep democratic revolution, has taken place. Re-education of the aggressor countries, creation among their citizens of an entirely new outlook, the firm establishment of new forms of governments compatible with the ideal and conception of a Free World, involve long-range responsibility for the United Nations. Even after the first period in which occupation will be ensured by the advance of the victorious forces, the solution of such a long-range problem will present military aspects. It will require primarily the possibility of the United Nations' not only making political decisions in common, but in addition, having such decisions carried out by a competent staff and a police force.

Development of peace, as well as progress of war, will require concerted action in the military field. Such an action will have to be based on principles entirely different from Balance of Power politics. Agreement between a few big Powers would not be sufficient. From the beginning, military security will have to derive from collective authority and be ensured by United Nations forces.

CHAPTER IV

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE PROBLEM OF AVIATION

MILITARY AVIATION

THE development in aviation during the war raises many new problems which will make collective security appear in new lights.

First of all, the tremendous expansion in aerial warfare and the use of vast numbers of planes have necessitated organization by the United Nations all over the free world in order to move and quarter the huge forces being recruited and trained. There are not only the air fields near the battle fronts, but there are also air lines and bases linking the various theaters of war, especially with the United States from where the bombing planes are ferried in increasing quantities to the fighting fronts.

Second, development in the air transportation of troops and supplies can be expected to assume tremendous proportions in the last phase of the war. The Air Transport Command of the United States Army already mans a great number of lines between its own country, Latin America, China, Africa, Arabia, Iran and India, as well as Canada and Alaska. There are probably more than one hundred bases already under

that Command, and the importance of its operations is constantly growing. At the end of the war, American industry will be equipped to construct large transportation planes in great quantities. There will be large reserves of such big airships and of trained pilots, navigators, and crews.

Such new conditions have made both the northern and southern air routes through the Atlantic, and the route towards Australia, India, and China across the south Pacific Ocean vital to the Allies.

The importance of maintaining free communication across the Atlantic by air, as well as by sea, was emphasized before the declaration of war by the United States in the Agreement it concluded in March 1941 with Great Britain whereby it obtained leases to important bases for a period of ninety-nine years. These bases included a chain of strategic points in Newfoundland, the Bermudas, and the Bahamas. In 1941, the United States also assumed responsibility for the defense of Iceland and Greenland as a precaution against possible attacks from Germany on these northern routes. It is certain that in the development of the war, a chain of bases spreading across the island of the central Pacific—now in Japanese hands—will be of primary interest to the United States and will later on constitute an essential factor in maintaining collective security in the Pacific area.

Agreements have also had to be negotiated with various South American countries in the interest of

hemispheric defense as well as to facilitate transport towards the fighting fronts. When such arrangements concern military bases, they are limited to the war period alone, or to a short time thereafter.

All those considerations will require a new outlook in international matters. They will create new problems in the relations between nations. Not all countries for instance, will be able to keep large air forces. Before the war, a certain number of them, although maintaining permanent armies, were already dependent on highly industrialized nations for their air armaments. The maintenance of air bases, moreover, means the keeping of their considerable and varied equipment in a constant state of repair with adequate facilities for such work, possibilities for the replacement of worn out material, stocks of fuel, a well-trained personnel and the accommodations for it.

There will be a legitimate desire on the part of Asiatic and European nations as well as of the Americas to enjoy permanent protection of their shores. Scientific progress may create entirely new conditions of military offense and defense such as the possibility of longer hops at high rates of speed, stratospheric flying, and the use not only of the present routes, but of the shortest ones possible over the North Pole. The defense of each nation, including that of the most powerful, depends not only on the situation of its air force, but on its relationship to that of other countries.

Collective security will mean the conclusion of

agreements as to military aviation much broader in scope than merely bilateral understandings and commitments. The United Nations will have to draw up a system of regional and universal arrangements for military aviation if there is not to be a recurrence of previous competition in aerial armaments. Such a race will fatally be run again if the defense of each nation remains its own obligation, or if groups of rival nations assume the responsibility of their combined protection. An international air force will be an essential feature of any efficient world organization to preserve peace.

The lesson of the past is eloquent in this respect. All technical problems relating to military aviation were extensively reviewed and discussed in Geneva, in the years 1932-33, at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Proposals were formulated for the limitation of the number and horsepower of military aircraft, for their complete abolition, for the abandonment of aerial bombings and also for the creation of an air police force. Thorough studies were made as to the offensive effectiveness of air armaments, their power to surprise and overcome national defense, and the threat which they represent for civilians. Decisive conclusions were not drawn from these preliminary and promising studies.¹ They would have been possible only within the framework of a

¹ See Preliminary Report on the work of The Conference. Prepared by the President, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Chapt. V. League of Nations IX Disarmament 1936 IX 3. Geneva 1936.

strong political international organization such as that which the United Nations must become and remain.

THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIAN AVIATION

Next comes the question of civilian aviation. No one can foresee today what the developments in passenger and cargo transportation in that field will be after the war. On this point, there are two schools of thought. One which contemplates a quick and enormous development of commercial aviation with tariffs three times lower than the current rates, and thousands of planes continuously flying commercial routes both within and without the various countries. The other viewpoint holds to the theory that the time is still far away when planes can replace ships carrying large cargoes over the Pacific or Atlantic; that such a development would continue to require astronomical expenditures; and that similar considerations as to disparity in cost will prevail as regards rail or truck versus air cargo shipments.

To whatever extent air service may develop in the near future, it is sufficient, however, to look at the situation of prewar days to see that the consideration of policies, prestige and military security may easily dominate national and international politics in this field.

The injection of politics into this domain before the war was the result of several causes. First of all, aviation in no country was completely independent of the

national government. Not having reached the self-supporting stage, the establishment of big international airlines meant support of the companies by direct governmental subsidies or indirect help through the transportation of mail, the granting of land for air fields, and of many other facilities in the establishment of their bases.

It is true that the system of private enterprise in the United States was maintained in this respect on a larger scale than in many other countries, but even here, public help was indirectly given, to the big companies especially, for the special purpose of linking the country with other lands. Governmental aid also helped them in the negotiations they had to make so as to obtain necessary authorizations for their operations abroad.

Second, only those Powers with worldwide interests and great industrial and financial capacity could enter into the competition for great international airlines. In fact, it was mainly the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia which were in a position to play important rôles in this field, although such countries as Holland and Belgium also had an important international air service. Sources of conflicts and distrust existed among them.

Nothing shows more clearly the political implications inherent in the establishment of international airlines than the worldwide activities of the German Company, Lufthansa, especially in South America.

Directly, or through subsidiaries, of which the Syndicate Condor in Brazil was perhaps the best known, the Lufthansa succeeded in counteracting the activities of the Pan American Airways on the South American continent. Before the war, the Lufthansa had almost as important a share of air traffic in those countries as had the United States. It maintained a strong situation in Brazil and Bolivia, interests in Argentina and Uruguay, and was competing also with the Americans in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.

The ambitions of the Germans had also led them to try to establish a service on the northern route through Iceland. In China, they had a large share of the Eurasia Aviation Company.

In the final period preceding the war, moreover, the Italian and German air enterprises in Latin America showed their tendency towards rendering each other mutual support.

There had been some measure of agreement also, though devoid of ideological implications between the Lufthansa and the French air lines, the latter of which had begun to diminish in importance in South America.

In a world which would still be disorganized and bent on rivalries, such situations could become more and more dangerous. Before the war, the need for establishing European air lines had naturally led to the conclusion of agreements between the largest companies of the big Powers. In the future, such arrangements within continents will certainly be necessary.

They should exist simultaneously with those of international scope in order to avoid a situation likely to involve a struggle for commercial dominance, shifting from competition between nations to competition between continents wherein, for instance, European and North American lines would try to gain predominance over each other in one or another part of the world.

The competition among powerful nations for political and commercial supremacy had its counterpart among weaker countries in their own efforts to protect themselves by whatever means possible. One way was through their balance of power policy by which they gave equal facilities to competing foreign air lines. Such was the situation in so many of the Latin American countries and in China. There was also a trend towards imposing restrictions of various kinds on foreign enterprises, such as the obligation to employ a large proportion of native pilots and personnel in the country in which foreign lines operated; another precaution consisted in various Latin American countries, for instance, of increasing the Army and Navy control over civilian airlines. Governments were trying more and more to take into their own hands the direction of air traffic in their respective countries, and to nationalize civilian aviation. Such a trend in Latin America is consonant with the increasing tendency towards greater nationalization of the economic life under the impulsion of the national governments.

As long as there are no firm and well-conceived

international arrangements based on mutual confidence, the result of such rivalries and distrust is bound to slow up not only progress towards peace, but the advancement of civil aviation as well. In fact, international strife prevented in yesterday's world the construction and operation of many airlines. Even before the Japanese aggression, the Chinese government was reluctant to grant new landing privileges to foreign companies because it was afraid that it might have to grant the same advantages to Japan. It is also striking that there were no direct airlines between North America and Tokio at a time when there were so many commercial links between the two countries, and when the Pan American Airways operated lines towards other parts of the Far East. The absence of air lines through Siberia to Japan was also conspicuous, and there was decided opposition in Moscow to any establishment of German continental airlines flying to China.

Military considerations explain the development of such restrictive policies. In regard to aviation, there is no guarantee that preparations for aggression and conquest could not be disguised under apparently peaceful commercial enterprises. Civilian pilots, navigators, radio operators, and crews can in fact be military agents. If frequently replaced, they can constitute the nucleus of air armadas capable of returning as conquering forces at some future time, just as the German boys who had found refuge in Norway and Holland

twenty years previously returned to those countries in German uniform during this present war.

It is also evident that civilian crews can take photographs of the land over which they fly, and familiarize themselves with the routes to be followed, as well as the strategic and industrial points to be bombed later on. Finally, the personnel of air bases and companies in foreign lands may assist in political propaganda and contribute to the spread of destructive ideologies, a danger which was clearly shown before the war in the activities of so many commercial agents of the Axis countries who were, in fact, super-salesmen of Naziism and Fascism.

FREEDOM OF THE AIR

The above considerations help one to understand why there has been some uneasiness expressed among the United Nations on the question of aviation. Fears have recently been evidenced in Great Britain concerning the expansion of American air transport industry. In such matters, the British are naturally world-minded, although it is to be noted that there were no British airlines in South America before the war. Transportation by sea and now by air as well, is the one essential means of retaining their various links with parts of the British Empire. The British feel that in both these fields their situation could be dangerously hampered after the war.

In the United States, however, fears have also been

expressed that a too liberal policy towards what is now called "freedom of the air" could imperil American interests in the anticipated competition.

This question involves, first of all, a correct understanding of just what freedom of the air means. There is a common complaint to the effect that even though long traditions of agreement between nations had practically established freedom of the seas to international trade, there was yet no possibility in the recent past of commercial planes' enjoying landing facilities in foreign countries without negotiations and special agreements made with the interested governments. Practically all merchantmen can enter every harbor in the world with no difficulty and no national discrimination. Why should not the same rights be granted to merchant planes?

It must be recognized here that in a non-cooperative world, even nominally at peace, one cannot escape the distinction between free entrance to commercial ports, and the right of flying freely over the land and surveying its industrial or military areas. Even the international airlines established by common agreement over continental Europe and the Near East before the war, had to follow previously prescribed routes and avoid the forbidden areas, as a matter of military precaution. As long as distrust prevails in the world, there will not be complete freedom of commercial aviation.

It was after the last war that principles of international law in these matters were established which are

still observed at the present time. In 1919, an International Convention was concluded which was signed by the United States, but was not ratified by its Government. A few Latin American countries are parties to that agreement which is, however, principally European. Later on, a Pan American Convention was signed at Habana in 1928 which establishes similar principles for the hemisphere. It is to be noted, however, that the Convention of 1919 created a permanent secretariat, the International Commission for Air Navigation, having definite though limited powers, while there is no machinery for controlling or carrying out the prescriptions laid down by the Pan American treaty.

The essential principles thus established are in conformity with the spirit existing after the last war, namely, that the sovereign rights of States were in no way to be diminished for any international entity. For years, official delegates at the Geneva Assembly expressed the highest confidence in the League's virtues and in the same speeches decried the idea of giving it any supranational powers.

So the principles established in 1919 provide that each State is to have complete sovereignty and jurisdiction over its own air space and its territorial waters. It can refuse to allow any air craft of a foreign Power to travel over the country in transit or to land in it.

Therefore, the only space free to all planes is that over the oceans beyond the territorial waters, and that

over those parts of the universe which may still not be in the possession of any particular State. A very great expanse, but few possibilities. Proposals for the development, through the International Commission for Air Navigation, of a very limited freedom of transit granted to international airlines by the Convention of 1919 were never accepted.

The result is that international relations in matters of air transport had to be dealt with through bilateral agreements between States—a great number of which were concluded—and thus all the consequences of political pressure by large Powers were brought in, and bargainings of many kinds took place between all States. Even in the case of negotiations by private companies, the influence of governments was predominant. No one can foresee how many decades might elapse before such arrangements would lead, if ever, to a vast network of airlines so that freedom of the air would be a reality for all men.

TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CIVILIAN AVIATION

Internationalization of Civil Air Transportation was extensively studied by the League of Nations. This was particularly true in 1932 and 1933 during the debates of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The Air Commission of that Conference discussed in detail all the various aspects of the problem on the basis of technical studies made by qualified

experts. In spite of the final failure of the Conference, some of the principles discussed even though not accepted then, are worth being pointed out here.

It was generally agreed that control of the air armaments must be accompanied by measures of international organization in matters of civilian aviation. As long as there exists complete liberty in the latter field, there will also exist the fear that civilian aviation may be used for military purposes. Such a conclusion would have required the granting of precise responsibilities to the League of Nations in the supervision of bodies having as their goal the internationalization of air forces as well as of air transport services. It is to be noted that such views were much in advance of the dominant ideas of the Air Commission of the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Experts at that time, while recognizing that the limitation of civil aviation is technically possible, expressed fears that measures of this kind would hamper progress and "thus run counter to the end in view, since the development of civil aviation, by facilitating communications, must, in the long run, help to strengthen peace."

They concluded that "except in the special case of aircraft lighter than the air, it is not practicable effectively to limit in any way the number and future of aircraft, whether commercial or military."¹

¹See: Objective Study on the Internationalization of Civil Aviation and on any other measure calculated to prevent the Signatory States from utilizing Civil Aviation for military purposes. League of Nations Publications IX Disarmament 1932 IX 43—Conf. D./C. A.G. 1932.

The first World War had not yet taught the lesson that such a patient approach to peace as that obtained through better communication and progressive education requires time and must, in the meantime, therefore, be strongly and efficiently protected.

In Geneva, although several delegations presented proposals on the question at the Air Commission of the Disarmament Conference, discussions at first centered largely around a proposal and a memorandum of the French delegation of February 5 and April 14, 1932.¹

The proposal took into consideration the results already obtained by international bodies in regard to civilian aviation, such as the International Commission for Air Navigation entrusted with the administration and revision of the Convention of 1919, and the International Air Traffic Association organized by the large European Air Companies. It asked for the creation of an International Civilian Air Transport Service.

Within this universal framework, international bodies set up under the name of "International Air Transport Unions" would have been established, and would have been entrusted with the setting up of continental, inter-continental, and inter-colonial lines.

The administrative and economic function of such Unions were defined in detail. They would have been placed under an assembly, a council, and a managing

¹Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments—Conference Documents, Vol. I, p. 113 ff., Geneva '32, & Vol. III P. 346 ff., Geneva 1935.

committee, the assembly consisting of representatives from all the member States of the Union. A procedure was established for the creation of international airlines; it was foreseen notably that the Union competent in this field should use the material best suited to the needs of the service and that orders would be equitably divided according to the special resources and industrial capacity of the participating States.

Those suggestions accompanied other proposals for the creation of an international force which would be permanently available, and at the disposal of the League of Nations, and the whole proposal was presented as offering to the League "the best opportunity that has ever occurred to make a definite choice between a League of Nations possessing executive authority and a League of Nations paralyzed by the uncompromising attitude of national sovereignty. France has made her choice," said the Proposal, "she suggests that the other nations should make theirs."

In regard to that, the League was divided into two camps as it was during all the debates on security and disarmament from 1921 to 1933. One consisted of the Powers which wanted to interpret strictly the provisions of the Covenant relating to the prevention of war so that the economic and military sanctions might be made as drastic and automatic as possible. The other included those governments which feared that such a system could involve them forcibly in a war of repression. The political situation, moreover, was to de-

teriorate rapidly after 1933, and at length the various proposals and protracted discussions on civilian aviation went through the same phase as had the other constructive efforts of the League of Nations.¹

Some of the principles then established must, nevertheless, be retained for the future. First) that under the name of International Air Force or any other suitable name, a permanent system of cooperation for the defense of peace should be established for air forces under a common authority. Second) that once the problem of bomber and fighter planes is solved, measures concerning civilian aviation will have to be taken if dissension is to be avoided. Third) that at least as far as civilian aviation is concerned, regional organization will have to be established. Fourth) that such regional setups will have to be included in a universal framework in order to avoid dangerous competition between continents or groups of countries.

International agreements of this kind would leave ample room for peaceful progress in technical achievements. They offer the only hope of seeing collective security as well as freedom of the air established in the near future.

¹See Preliminary Report on The Work of The Conference—Prepared by The President, Mr. Arthur Henderson, pp. 69ff. League of Nations. IX Disarmament 1936 IX. 3. Geneva 1936.

CHAPTER V

THE COMBINED BOARDS IN WASHINGTON DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

IN SPITE of the striking fact that there are no institutions corresponding in extent and function to the concept of the United Nations, the impression has sometimes been created that they already have at their disposal sufficient machinery to meet their most pressing present needs and even some of their future requirements.

There is a contradiction between such a hope and the criticism so often formulated that there is no real United Nations organization at all.

The Combined United States-Great Britain Combined Boards in Washington are most commonly cited as proof that machinery has been created to translate into action the will and powers of the United Nations. What is the scope and nature of their present activities and functions? What is the prospect of their rendering useful services in reconstruction work after the war?

ROLE AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE COMBINED BOARDS

There is no doubt that the Combined Boards represent a really efficient means for action now at the dis-

posal of the United Nations. Essentially, however, their purpose is to insure greater integration in the American-British war effort. In such capacity, therefore, they do not set a pattern for United Nations machinery. As great as may be the importance of their negotiations with other Allied nations, and the services they render in carrying out plans of interest to all these nations, an organization with such limitation as to scope and composition cannot be considered adequate for the creation of a new and lasting relationship between many nations. In its essence it is a happy and efficient combination of diplomacy and well-conceived war measures.

But a variety of new ties is created between the United Nations through the activities of the Combined Boards. It is to be hoped that such ties will not disappear, and it is to be expected that the Boards themselves will meet a better fate than the Inter-Allied organizations of the last war and will be asked to continue their services after the fighting is over.

There will be a strong tendency, then, among the governments to maintain their reliance upon experiences acquired during the war. Many of the problems having to be solved at that time will require not only clear decisions and outlook, but will also demand men and organizations capable of using efficiently and decisively the means at their disposal.

It is also certain, however, that transformation and adaptation of the existing bodies will be necessary.

Those of the war organizations which will be retained will undergo profound changes both in their internal organization and in their relation to other bodies and to the various governments united in the construction of peace. Their membership and the particular function of each will have to be modified if they are to become permanent. They will have to be placed under United Nations authority.

It may even be taken for granted, not only that the Combined Boards will have to adjust themselves all at once to the new conditions and needs existing at the end of the war, but also that there will be a longer and continuous process of adaptation to changing needs. Nobody can foresee now how long the period of transition from war to peace will be. It is difficult to foresee how soon the activities of relief can be combined with the work of rehabilitation; or when it will be possible to concentrate exclusively on rehabilitation of Europe and Asia, and how the instruments of collaboration, able, like the combined Boards, to help in this immense enterprise might again, through additional changes, become parts of the final machinery of international collaboration in a free and reorganized world.

Four of the Combined Boards¹ are dealing with problems which, being essential to the conduct of the war, will still have vital importance after victory. They are the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Com-

¹See p. 32 for reference to the Fifth Board, the Combined Munitions Assignments Board.

bined Resources and Production Board, the Combined Food Board, and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

THE COMBINED RAW MATERIALS BOARD

The Combined Raw Materials Board was established in January, 1942 for the purpose of pooling the raw material resources of the United States and Great Britain, of planning how to increase their output, and of working in collaboration with others of the United Nations so as to render them similar services.

The Raw Materials Board, of all the Boards now existing in Washington, has probably become as a result of the tasks assigned to it, the one group most nearly representing the United Nations. With the help of various United States and British agencies,¹ it has maintained close contact with other United Nations and also conducted direct negotiations with their representatives in Washington. The requirements of Russia are handled by this Board in accordance with the Protocol agreements which were signed with her. In addition, requirements of raw materials essential to our Russian allies had to be met from time to time. There was also coordination with India and the Dominions, except for Canada which, in these matters,

¹An Advisory Operating Committee of the Board which meets weekly has been constituted and is composed of representatives of the Department of State, the War Production Board, the Department of Commerce, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Lend-Lease Administration, and of the following British bodies: Foreign Office, Ministry of Production, Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Economic Warfare.

deals with the Board through the United States-Canadian Committee. Special action was taken through the sending of a United States-Great Britain technical mission to the Belgian Congo which constitutes an important source of valuable raw materials. The territories under General de Gaulle were also important sources of such materials. The liberation of Madagascar, North and West Africa, and French Guiana has opened new fields of activities to the Board. It had to deal with other countries, friendly or neutral, notably in South America, in collaboration with the Board of Economic Warfare which does its best to develop new sources of the various raw materials essential to the prosecution of war.

Never before in any war have the problems of supply, production, and distribution of war materials been so acute. Preparation for battles is half the triumph. The Nazis well understood this before they launched their attacks upon Poland and France. For the Allies, the problem was made more difficult when many sources of vital new materials fell into the hands of the Japanese or the Germans. Not only finished weapons and machinery, but also the raw materials which are not produced on a world-wide scale had to be sent to factories in the big Allied producing countries and behind the battlefronts in order to avoid a diminution of production for the Allies through lack of such materials as steel, petroleum products, or tin—to mention only a few of them,

To the problem of efficient distribution according to needs, must be added the problem of combining allocations in such a way that the minimum of shipping transportation is required.

The operations of the Board during the past year helped considerably in "bringing order out of what might have been chaos," said Mr. William L. Batt, Vice Chairman of the War Production Board and Chairman of the United States Division of the Combined Board, in a report issued in February 1943, on the work of this body for the first year of operation ended January 26, 1943. During this period the Board, which functions as a central clearing house for the movements of raw materials from and to the associated nations, has made recommendations covering about thirty strategic materials such as copper, tin, nickel, and rubber, after complete studies of the situation. Consideration based on less detailed surveys was also given to many other materials including, for example, iron ore, and aluminum.

As a result of those activities, says Mr. Batt in his report, "World traffic in raw materials among the United Nations now flows in an orderly fashion. The Board provides a meeting ground where all can go and get a decision that will be accepted and implemented."

Out of such experience thus gained during the war, it seems evident that much can be used to advantage when the war is over. It would be a mistake to think

that a harmonious settlement of the problem of distribution of raw materials will become an easy one after a short period of reorganization. First of all, the lesson of prewar days reminds us that a lack of sufficient international cooperation in such matters leads to anarchy, restrictions, and dangerous rivalries. The claims of the nations which called themselves the "have not" nations have certainly been largely motivated by the desire of the most powerful and ambitious of them,—Germany, Japan, and Italy,—to embark upon a program of conquest and domination. But the enjoyment by all States of access, on equal terms, to the raw materials of the world is one of the aims proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter.

It is indeed difficult to foresee at this time what national economic systems will prevail after the war. Profound differences, perhaps, will persist between the economic policies of many countries. If, however, there is not to be complete lack of harmony once more, one may be sure that as far as the raw materials are concerned, there will be more national and international regulation than in the past. Governmental and intergovernmental organization will certainly be more extensive in this field than in any other part of commercial and industrial life. The development of backward countries rich in unexploited resources and the opening of their production to other nations will also loom large in the world of tomorrow.

A situation more difficult than that at present will

develop as soon as the fighting is over. The number of potential purchasers of raw materials will increase immediately, and the demand of the liberated countries and the needs of the devastated lands in Europe and Asia will be tremendous.

Part of the duty of such bodies as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, will be to solve the difficulties which will inevitably arise. But such newly created bodies would be faced with an insuperable task if they had to develop from scratch the machinery they will need. They will certainly derive advantage from reliance upon organizations already existing which have handled the problem of distributing raw materials during the war.

THE COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD

From the very beginning of the war, when Great Britain and France were placing orders in the then-neutral United States, it was evident that their programs of production would be deeply affected later on by the anticipated development of manufacturing plants in that country. With the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act and with the entrance of the United States into the war, it became necessary to look for as great an integration as possible in the industrial power of Great Britain and the United States. They are the two largest producing countries. They have the responsibility not only of arming their own forces, but

also of furnishing material and weapons to their allies. Moreover, it is necessary here to make arrangements with the industries of the other United Nations.

The attainment of efficiency in this field means continuous planning and adjustment, especially as regards the division of work and production between the United States and Great Britain at a time when American production is continuing to expand; when new designs for weapons are being worked out, and new threats, like the submarine offensive, must be met by a new effort towards building vessels of defense, attack and transportation. Here again we are presented with the necessity of reducing to a minimum the demands on shipping by avoiding transport of weapons or products which can be obtained nearer the battle-fronts. The strategic requirements of the war, the need of the constantly increasing armies of the United Nations which must be equipped with the most modern weapons, the provision for the essential needs of the civilian populations, all these also have to be constantly considered in the very midst of the global war and its changing conditions.

In order to plan the necessary collaboration in industrial matters, the Combined Production and Resources Board was created in June 1942. On November 10, 1942, a Canadian Section was added to those of the United States and Great Britain because of the "very close relations" in the production field which already existed between the three countries.

The functioning of that body, which is essential to the translation in terms of production programs of the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, has already led to important and satisfactory results. It works, not only as a clearing house for the United Nations in industrial matters, but also as a place for adjusting a necessary collaboration between the various agencies which in the United States and Great Britain deal with the questions of production. A close cooperation is maintained with the Combined Raw Materials Board as a result of the intimate relations between their fields of action. Two permanent Joint Committees on Steel and Copper respectively have been created by those Boards.

In the comparatively limited area of a trilateral collaboration, the Board met some of the difficulties which lie at the base of all international collaboration, namely the problem of insuring a sufficient measure of integration between activities conducted along different lines and according to varying administrative methods. The machinery of the British Government, especially in time of war, is more centralized than that of the United States. Final decisions on production problems may be obtained from its War Cabinet, while more complicated adjustments must be sought through numerous agencies in order to correlate the huge and powerful production machine of the United States to the requirements determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Such difficulties, which also confront other Combined bodies working on United States-Great Britain cooperation, may be considered as merely forerunners of the complications requiring solution during the period of rehabilitation, not only in the liberated countries, but also in the free warring nations of today. Demobilization of war industries, the adaptation of those industries to peaceful pursuits, the reconstruction of ruined economies,—such are some of the major problems which will have to be faced simultaneously.

It will be a great task to try to meet, at one and the same time, the minimum requirements of today's producing countries and the tremendous demands for machines and materials made by the other nations. Part of the factories and plants in Europe and Asia will have been destroyed. Industry will have been completely disorganized by the Germans in the once-flourishing countries of Europe. Moreover, important plants constructed solely for war purposes in many countries will have to be greatly transformed and re-equipped to produce for peacetime requirements. Such readaptation will be in some cases comparatively easy; but in other cases, as in the big factories which are producing bombers, for instance, readaptation will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Transportation will have to be reorganized over entire continents.

There will certainly have to be means of practical international collaboration in given areas of the world

in order to promote the common effort toward economic reconstruction. But such regional enterprises will have to rely on a well-organized center which will serve as a clearing house for technical knowledge and its practical application. Properly expanded, the Combined Production and Resources Board may furnish the nucleus for such an international body.

THE COMBINED FOOD BOARD

It is a well-known fact that the food problem is becoming more acute with the passing of each day. Food strategy is essential to winning the war.

There are the needs of the fighting armies, of the troops in training, of the civilian populations behind the lines and in countries far distant from the fields of battle. The very occupation of additional territory like that of North and West Africa, systematically stripped by the Germans of their resources, adds just so much more to the immediate difficulty of that problem.

Although the United States now produces more food than ever before, the civilians are feeling to an increasing degree the pinch of rationing. Such restrictions have long since been stringently enforced in Britain and even more so in Russia and China.

Rationing in the United States comes primarily as a result of its having to meet the requirements of the growing American army and of assuring a supply for the civilian population, maintaining satisfactory nutri-

tion standards, and yet controlling higher civilian purchasing power. In addition, imports of food and agricultural products from abroad had to be reduced. There next enters into the picture the help desperately needed by the Allies from the United States in avoiding the threat of famine and undernourishment.

Such a necessity is illustrated by the fact that the British themselves, in spite of reduced food supplies at home, have had to send food to the civilian population in North Africa in advance of sufficient American shipments. Russia, as a result of the mobilization of her adult population to such a great extent, and the loss of vast agricultural regions, now needs more supplies than ever before.

Last year, food shipments abroad were generally small in relation to the total supply of the United States. That aid, however, was vital to the Allies and will continue to be so. The Lend-Lease program of 1943 will undoubtedly provide for greater shipments of food than it did in 1942. It is expected that more than half of all these Lend-Lease food shipments will have to go to Russia alone.

The Combined Food Board was created in June 1942 for the purpose of pooling and distributing all available food resources of the United Nations, and of helping in the development of additional supplies. The Board thus had to work in close collaboration with the representatives of other United Nations and the various agencies sharing responsibility for the

success of food strategy. The most complicated considerations come into the picture. The sending of food to a theater of war, or to an Allied country, depends not only on the availability of the needed supplies or even of the necessary shipping facilities. It may have to be delayed to allow the allocation of space to more pressing needs on another front. Constant adjustments are necessary to provide for strategic requirements as well as for unforeseen situations resulting from development of the struggle. They are also necessary in order to obviate scarcity of certain supplies and to foster farm production in allied and friendly countries by sending agricultural materials where most needed. Plans and programs have to be made in advance in order to determine and meet needs everywhere.

Such problems, which now demand special machinery, will require even more complicated systems for their solution immediately following the war. Food at the disposal of the United Nations will be a weapon as effective then as now. They will, at that time, have to bring the liberated countries back into the common endeavor of building toward prosperity.

Victory would be jeopardized as soon as won if starvation and epidemics were to swell in the wake of the United Nations' armies.

Huge difficulties will then arise. Rehabilitation will evidently have to be taken care of at the same time as relief from famine. Seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural implements of all kinds will be urgently needed.

Cattle will have been slaughtered in all conquered lands. The herds will have to be increased, distributed where most needed, and fodder must be raised and provided in adequate quantities. The experience from the last war shows that such problems cannot be solved in a short period of time. They require years of well-planned cooperation, especially when presented on such a vast scale. In addition, the scarcity of many essential foods which is already felt, apart from wheat and other cereals, as well as the heavy demands on transportation facilities, will make the question of allocation and distribution of agricultural supplies more acute than ever.

Here again, a great part of the work of relief and reconstruction will have to be conducted on the field in the devastated areas.

Under the impetus of war, measures have already been taken to deal in this way with problems of civilian supplies. Such is the task for instance, of the Middle East Supply Center set up in Cairo in April 1941. Another Center now functions in North Africa. Such regional setups are related to the central organizations functioning in London and Washington.

That shows what the pattern of a practical international collaboration might be for supplying civilian needs after the war, of which food will represent one of the more urgent.

A greater number of such regional machineries will have to be created after victory. They will be com-

bined organizations also, permitting the unification of effort by the producing countries and the newly liberated ones. In questions relating to food and agriculture, they will be especially useful. They will be directly connected with the larger Agency of Relief and Reconstruction. But the latter, as regards the carrying out of the practical measures of planning and distribution will probably have to rely upon the experience of the Food Board.

THE COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD

The planning today of military operations, movements of armies, transportation of raw materials, and distribution of any kind of weapons and supplies means first of all solving the problems of shipping. Activities of all the combined agencies mentioned above depend largely upon the free movement of the merchant marine over the high seas, and upon the quantity of available space on ships.

Responsibility in these matters rests primarily with the United States and Great Britain. Other merchant marines, notably those of the governments-in-exile, of Fighting France, of North Africa, and of various Latin American nations, participate in the common effort. But their movements are respectively under the direction of the British Ministry of War Transport and of the shipping authorities of the United States where, by Executive Order of February 1942, a War Shipping Administration was established in the Executive

Office of the President. The harmonizing of the policies of the two administrations is insured by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board which functions in Washington and a similar Combined Board in London.

Demobilization and relief, the re-adaptation of industries to peacetime production, and the gradual reconstruction of world trade will, in spite of the disappearance of submarine warfare, keep the problem of shipping in the first rank of United Nations' pre-occupations after the war.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between two periods. During the first, the most pressing needs and public demand from every quarter will necessitate the maintenance of adjustments similar to those established by the Boards in Washington and London.

Fairly soon afterwards, however, an entirely new situation will develop. Thanks to the tremendous effort of the United Nations in shipbuilding, the first period of scarcity will soon be succeeded by one in which there will be an excess of shipping facilities.

The greatest part of world tonnage will then belong to the United States which will also have enormously increased its shipbuilding production. Other shipyards will be functioning in Europe. Production capacity will greatly exceed the postwar demand. The problem then will be an international one requiring settlement by inter-governmental agreements. It will be closely linked with various other economic problems

of international scope. The United Nations will have to conclude the necessary arrangements for establishing orderly allocation of an excessive, though unevenly divided, total in shipping facilities between the different countries. They will also have to help in the demobilization of shipbuilding plants and workers in that industry, as well as controlling the diversion of these plants and men to other spheres of activities.

It will be impossible to maintain completely free competitive conditions in a world which has a superabundance of shipping and shipbuilding facilities. For many European nations, deprived of a great many resources they had before the war in the way of services abroad, the rebuilding of their merchant marines will be vital. Even Great Britain will very likely be left with a total tonnage considerably less than the level of 1939. In order to avoid a ruinous rivalry, a certain measure of United Nations shipping control will have to be maintained.

COORDINATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

In conclusion, it is clear that the nucleus of the machinery created to strengthen the common effort of Great Britain and the United States and to help them in their dealings with other United Nations should render valuable service after the war is over.

Their very existence reminds us of a rule which could often be usefully applied in national affairs, but which is even more vitally important in international

organization, namely, that coordination of existing facilities must always prevail over the creation of entirely new machineries, unless the latter are quite indispensable.

But it must be remembered in this connection that the task of the Combined Boards is now essentially one of helping to carry out satisfactorily the decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Munitions Assignments Board in the planning of operations, the allocation and the distribution of implements of war.

The Chiefs of Staff themselves work out in detail the policy which is affirmed from time to time by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, while the necessary measure of agreement with Russia, China and other United Nations is sought by a system of negotiations.

The fundamental basis for such action is, above all, the decision taken by the Allies to agree on common action in the different fields where wholehearted cooperation is necessary. Negotiations and recommendations, rendered easier by the pressure of war needs, are the weapons of the Combined Boards.

A system which has been called "Agreements to Agree" does not, however, furnish the foundation for a permanent collaboration such as should be established between nations at peace. In order to make it a lasting peace, other principles should often be applied and translated into action by bodies endowed

with other kinds or responsibilities than those of the Combined United States-Great Britain agencies now functioning in Washington.

Indeed, the usefulness and the very success during the reconstruction period of those boards and of the practical methods of cooperation which they practice, will depend upon the creation of, and their gradual incorporation in larger United Nations bodies.

The difficulties which all the Combined Boards have to face now, such as those which result from differences in organization and functioning between the administrative agencies in Great Britain and the United States, will not be of lesser scope when many more governments are associated in the common enterprise of economic restoration.

It is a basic rule that in order to make collective collaboration fruitful and efficient, a certain degree of adaptation to the requirements of the international bodies must be obtained from the national institutions dealing with the problems to be solved in common. The procedure of the past, that of looking for such adjustments through negotiations only, will no longer be adequate to meet the demands of our complicated age, especially when the hard necessities of war will not help to overcome obstacles standing in the way of mutual understanding. There must be, then, a common will, ways of attaining decisions in common, and executive bodies to carry them out.

CHAPTER VI

RELIEF ORGANIZATION

EVIDENCE that the United Nations are conscious of the vast number of postwar tasks likely to confront them, is shown by the lengthy negotiations on the subject of relief which have occurred during the past several months. These have been carried on by the four major warring nations, but will eventually lead to a broader understanding between all of the United Nations. These negotiations had been preceded by the work of the British Government in collaboration with the European governments-in-exile, and the National Committee of the Fighting French, through the Inter-Allied Committee created in London in 1941, and its secretariat,—a Bureau maintained by the British Government. The President of the Inter-Allied Committee, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, spent several months in Washington last year for the purpose of participating in the discussions going on at that time between Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China. The United States has set up an Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations under Mr. Herbert H. Lehman, former Governor of New York.

The necessity of starting preparations for work before that work can actually be undertaken, has been

fully recognized in this field; and an important step towards subsequent rehabilitation of the devastated areas has thus been made.

THE NORTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

A recent illustration of the need for such careful preparation was shown when American and British troops landed in North Africa and met a problem such as will face the United Nations on a much greater scale later on. War had not yet come directly to North and West Africa at the time when the Allied Fleet appeared off the shores of Morocco and Algeria. A situation had developed in those countries, however, which made the question of relief most urgent, and required immediate solution even as the Allied troops were marching forward. The Germans had actually stripped all of those territories of their most valuable resources to such an extent that food and consumer goods were extremely scarce. Even fruits, as well as oils and fats which are produced in such great quantities in those countries, were not available to the African population. Their complete isolation from the Free World, moreover, had profoundly disrupted the economy of that part of the French Empire. Many manufactured products, indispensable to the native populace—such as cotton cloth—and which cannot be produced in non-industrialized countries, had been lacking for two years. They also felt the scarcity of implements for the cultivation of food products.

If such a situation had not been adequately met, it could have impaired greatly the efficiency of military operations. One can only expect trouble for occupational authorities and troops—certainly no assistance—if the native populace is ragged, hungry, and a prey to epidemics. And no advantage can be derived from the natural wealth of a country if the capacity of the inhabitants to work and the facilities at their disposal are dangerously reduced, as was the case in North Africa. To ignore this would have meant the continuous use of more shipping to send food to the American and British troops stationed in Africa. And the production of raw materials such as phosphates and iron ore for the use of the United Nations would have been lacking as a contribution from North Africa. Wheat, fruits, vegetables of all kinds, wine, olive oils and mutton from North Africa may become of considerable importance to the troops of the United Nations, and such supplies may be kept for reserve stocks to be used in Europe. There are many other useful products which can be obtained from Western French Africa.

Thus the American, British and French authorities were faced, on a limited scale, with those essential problems which form the major difficulties of any relief and reconstruction action, including the establishment of a regular collaboration with the administrative authorities and various local organizations, civilian and military. They had more than a glimpse of what the political implications of such arrange-

ments are. Also, the necessity of sending supplies to the civilian population was necessary at a time when military needs of all sorts were urgent. Various measures of organization had to be taken, such as the creation of a small Combined Committee in Washington to deal with the problem of sending supplies to North Africa, and of setting up another combined organization in the involved territory.

Tunisia afforded the first example of a country with a fairly large Allied population liberated by victory from direct occupation by an enemy army. Preparations had been made in advance to provide food, clothing and medical supplies for some 700,000 civilians. The necessary stocks had been assembled by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. The army, under which control relief had to be conducted in its first stages, had set up a "Tunisian detachment," on which the Office was represented, to plan for relief of the civilians. The French were to provide local personnel to help with the distribution.

PROBLEMS AHEAD

Those same problems, but greatly multiplied in number and size, will eventually exist in Europe and Asia. It is difficult to imagine to what extent the ruthless exploitation of the conquered lands by Germans, Italians, and Japanese will have left the populations helpless and impoverished. Everyone is familiar with the food situation in all European countries, especially

acute in some parts of the continent, such as Greece and Poland, but everywhere tragic and threatening. The system of food requisitioning by the Germans is one of the most strict and efficient ever enforced by a conqueror. Starvation and famine will be rampant throughout the continent, leaving a trail of diseases and epidemics. The situation will be just as difficult where clothing is concerned. Vast areas of dwellings will have been destroyed by active warfare.

Devastation in the occupied parts of Russia and Poland will far exceed the ruins of the last war. In Belgium and Northern France where battles raged for the duration of only a few weeks, a great number of villages and parts of towns were wiped out. Allied bombings have added to the havoc. The problem of reconstruction will certainly be greater than that following the last war, and a large part of the work of the populations will have to be used to this end rather than to that of production itself.

It must not be forgotten that industrial facilities will also have been greatly reduced, as well as disorganized, by the systematic Nazi policy of transferring manufacturing plants to Germany. They will thus have disrupted Europe's industrial economy which was already unevenly distributed during peace, leaving a large part of the continent, especially in the south-east, considerably undeveloped in that respect. Even though some war industries were established by the Germans in areas relatively free from bombings, those

industries will not be of assistance during the first stages of relief.

The need of the Axis for manpower will certainly add to the disorganization of European economics. Millions of foreign workers are now toiling, against their will, in Germany. They will revolt as soon as possible, and will go back to their own countries where additional problems of re-employment and relief will thus be created. Moreover, large parts of the populations,—such as the Poles, the Alsatians, the people of Lorraine and the Jews, —transferred by the Germans for political purposes, will also return to their homes. It would be entertaining an illusion to imagine that such returns to native lands can be delayed for long.

Questions of relief will come simultaneously with the need of shifting many troops to occupy the Axis countries, and at a time when the system of transportation will be completely disorganized, not only because many of the harbors will have been destroyed on the shores of the Atlantic, and probably on those of the Mediterranean, but also because Germany has conscripted for the needs of its own armies all the rail and trucking facilities of Europe.

Many of the means of transportation which the Nazis already partially lack will completely disappear during the final stages of military operations when the Allied forces are decisively crushing the enemy. Relief was restricted and delayed by such difficulties after the last war and will be again to a far greater extent this time.

Finally, all the European countries which have been conquered and overrun by the Axis Powers will have been financially ruined. Indeed, there is no system of stable currency left in Europe, where the German depredations have condemned all their victims to limitless inflation.

All of these problems, some of which will require years for their solution, will nevertheless have to be faced immediately, if the first effort toward relief is to produce effective results and amount to the first step taken in creating sound economies in the liberated countries.

THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF RELIEF

Relief and rehabilitation do not constitute a problem merely of specialized and material spheres of action. It will be a problem also involving political questions and will have repercussions, in one way or another, in all the many countries which will be participants in such activities, either as supplying or receiving nations.

If there could be any doubt as to the political implications involved in such work, one would only need to consider the situation existing after the last war. At that time, there was not only decided reluctance on the part of the Western World to give aid to the Soviets while they were struggling for power in Russia, but there was, at the same time, evidence of distrust and hesitance among the Soviets in regard to accept-

ing such help. They feared that such efforts might be a cover for anti-Communist activities, and might result in aiding the foes of the Soviet Government. Not until September 1921, after the great famine in Russia, was the work of relief really started there, even though earlier action could have spared that nation much suffering, many deaths, and great ill-feeling and distrust toward former Allies.

No one at this time can foresee whether or not there will be contentions in various European nations as to what authorities should rule the country. The decision as to what authorities should receive the aid proffered by the United Nations will have vital political importance. A wrong decision in choosing, against the true will of the people, could mean that victory will not result in peace.

ACTIVITIES IN THE INTELLECTUAL FIELD

A curtain of darkness has descended upon all of occupied Europe as a result of the victories of the Nazis. Gestapo agents and their accomplices have done their best to prevent outside news from reaching the conquered populations. United Nations broadcasts, which the Nazis cannot completely obstruct, are the only source of reliable information for people resisting foreign oppression. From the Axis broadcasting stations and those controlled by their puppet European or Asiatic governments, the most insidious and insistent propaganda of slogans and lies has beaten

upon the ears and into the minds of the people. The printing and selling of publications written by liberal authors, past or present, is strictly forbidden. Text-books have been replaced by manuals conforming to Nazi theories. Educators and teachers are closely watched. The foundations of the liberal and progressive systems of education which flourished in the democratic countries have been destroyed.

Such a vicious and tenacious effort has largely failed, thanks to the indomitable spirit of resistance which has produced heroes and martyrs all over the world. But even though faith and convictions remain unshaken, information and documentation are lacking. Much of what has taken place in the outside world during the past three years is completely unknown. And in those lands very little is heard of the trends of thought in the free countries, of the research and creative work carried on there, or of achievements of the United Nations and their plans for the future.

Many schools, moreover, will lie in ruins. Libraries and universities will have been destroyed, and their personnel reduced through persecutions. Although material help will first be needed, the Relief Agency must also prepare to bring intellectual nourishment to those countries now engulfed in Fascist darkness.

There is a growing interest among free nations in establishing international collaboration in matters of education. Nothing will be more vitally indicated in the future. The collaboration in that field, however,

means the carrying out of a long-range program, the building up of a well-run system of real, and continuously effective cooperation between the various nations. These nations will have to devote the necessary amount of attention to that vital concern as soon as the proper time comes. They must then create the national and international parts of the machinery necessary to ensure progress and dissemination of democratic and modern education. In fact, that will mean organization in the whole field of cultural contacts, creating from their valuable and protected diversity of character and increasing richness, a community of outlook and convictions. Steps may, and must be taken to prepare such an immense postwar enterprise. But the first and most pressing one must be to recreate the atmosphere and facilities which will permit the establishment of intellectual foundations of future world cooperation.

The United Nations Relief Agency will render a vital service if it is ready to fulfill that task. Facts must be made known to the liberated world. It must be given immediate information as to what has taken place during the years when it was separated from the fighting United Nations. That requires material being prepared for the public, as well as for the teachers—especially primary and secondary teachers who reach the youth of nations, and documentation for research and scientific studies. Special consideration will also have to be given to the practical side of the question:

to the reconstruction and reorganization of schools, universities, laboratories and research centers.

SUPPLYING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES

Another important question to be considered is that of there being two categories of countries namely, those having to be rescued from the depths of impoverishment, and the ones which are able to help towards such salvation. The greater part of Asia, and practically the whole of continental Europe will come within the first category. Supplies for those people will have to be furnished by the rest of the world, principally by the Americas, but also by Africa, some parts of Asia, by Australia and New Zealand. Some of the European nations, badly in need of help, will also have something to say regarding the disposition of supplies under their control in other territories, such as those in Africa.

The position of the United States will be extremely important, not only because of the supplies and the transportation facilities at its disposal, but also because it will play a leading role in determining the financial arrangements with the other nations participating in the rescue work. However, reserve stocks of supplies in the United States will be much less important in quantity than was the case after the last war.

How will all these various interests be adjusted in an efficient organization? After the last war, the work of

relief was practically put into the hands of the United States. A proposal that the Inter-Allied Organizations then existing in London be put in charge of European relief was not accepted. Mr. Herbert Hoover, who already had much experience in such matters as a result of his being Head of the Commission for Relief which had operated during the war in Belgium and Occupied France, was finally appointed Director General of Relief.

Mr. Hoover, of course, maintained contact with the Supreme War Council which was still functioning, and especially, with the Supreme Economic Council, which dealt with questions of rehabilitation, food, and other relief. It may be said, however, that the enterprise as a whole was American. The American Relief Administration of which Mr. Hoover was also Director was, in fact, the all-powerful Agency dealing with the problem.

A different kind of solution will be attempted this time. From the very beginning, Russia has displayed much interest in the problem, and her Ambassador, Mr. Litvinov, was most active in the negotiations which took place in Washington, as were the representatives of Great Britain and China. Though the proposals to be presented to the United Nations were prepared by negotiations between these few countries, it was decided from the outset that the enterprise should be run by a United Nations Agency.

Such a decision was sound. The immense difficulties

to be encountered will not be satisfactorily handled unless political and organizational problems are dealt with in common and are effectively settled.

NEGOTIATIONS AND ORGANIZATION IN WASHINGTON

But, as long as there is no body representing the political unity of the United Nations, it was to be foreseen that the political aspect of the relief would make negotiations more delicate. There is also danger that the Relief Agency will have to solve simultaneously the purely political problems which should be dealt with by another body, as well as the difficulties which are directly its own concern.

In relief, as in other matters, a full Assembly of the thirty-two United Nations of today cannot meet frequently enough to make all the decisions on the measures to be taken; to supervise regularly the activities of the Secretariat of the relief organization, and to draw up the detailed program of its action.

The General Relief Council of the United Nations will probably meet only at fairly long intervals, twice a year, for example.

In the meantime, a more limited body will have to function which will have as its main responsibility the real government and direction of the work to be prepared and carried out by a Director General and other officials.

Insofar as international action is concerned, universal or regional, it is a general rule that the following

broad outlines must be accepted: a General Council, an Executive Council, and an International Secretariat.

The solution which naturally presented itself to the negotiators in Washington, was to think of a directing or executive committee which would be appointed by the General Relief Council of the thirty-two nations and would really shape the policies of the whole setup. This Committee would be composed of representatives of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China—the four governments which, for months, have conducted, to all practical purposes, the whole initiative in this field.

It may be wondered whether such a decision would really correspond to the needs of the situation. The concept of the Big Four is really an actual necessity in the present stage of the war. It will probably have to be changed and enlarged before final victory. Such a combination does not yet function fully in political matters.

Since it has not been possible to apply such a concept in the political field, is it a good solution to try a first application of it in the special field of relief?

Some doubts may be expressed. The negotiators were soon faced with proposals to enlarge the governing committee to include representatives of other nations which will furnish an important part of relief, namely, some of the Dominions and the South American countries. There is also the question of the role to

be played tomorrow by the liberated peoples themselves, especially if one thinks that obtaining relief will be a problem of major consideration to governments then coming into power. In addition, one must remember the lesson of the League of Nations and the continuous difficulties which arose as to the composition of its Council. Would it be possible to satisfy Latin America by adding one of the nations of its continent to the Executive Council of the Relief Organization, or to satisfy all of the governments-in-exile, not to mention the people themselves, by choosing one of them to represent the interests of the others?

In fact, such difficulties will be settled only provisionally now within the framework of relief organization. They will have to be settled permanently some day by organizing a system of political relationship between the United Nations. A way will then have to be found to recognize, in the Councils of the United Nations, the differences in responsibilities existing among them, and give to the conquered countries of today a place corresponding to the role they will play in regional and world affairs.

When this day comes, those political decisions involved in the questions of relief and reconstruction will be left to the political bodies of the United Nations system. The central relief organization functioning in Washington will devote its entire activities to the huge problem of organization coming at the end of the hostilities.

In the meantime, it will have to prepare efficiently, in collaboration with the interested governments and such other agencies as the Inter-Allied Committee in London, the Combined Boards and various United States agencies in Washington, the work to be carried out later on in the fields of food, health, clothing, housing, nutrition, and production.

One of the more important aspects of such a preparation will be, besides assuring the resources necessary for efficient relief, the organization for the necessary work in the liberated areas by competent field workers. Vital parts of the organization for relief will be the regional ones. They will function on the spot as combined organizations in which not only the United States and other nations supplying relief, but the countries receiving it, will collaborate.

CHAPTER VII

OTHER PARTS OF THE INTER- ALLIED MACHINERY

THE infinite task of cooperation performed by the United Nations is the responsibility of several other bodies in addition to the ones mentioned before.

THE STRATEGY OF LEND-LEASE

Prominent in promoting an entirely new kind of solidarity between the nations of the Free World is the Lend-Lease. It is the symbol of the all-out effort of the United Nations towards common work and common victory. Forty-three Allied or friendly nations have been declared eligible for Lend-Lease. Special Agreements have been concluded with thirty of them. The most important of such agreements indicate for the future the application of entirely new principles in economic matters.¹ In addition, four reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreements were signed with Great Britain, Australia, Fighting France and New Zealand.

¹See REPORT TO THE 78th CONGRESS ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS, from the Passage of the Act, March 11, 1941 to December 31, 1942, submitted by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator. Lend-Lease Administration, Washington, D. C., January, 1943.

See also *THE UNITED NATIONS, What They Are, What They May Become*, Chapters III and VI; *THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE WAY*, Chapter V. World Citizens Association, Chicago, 1942.

Although the United States receives ever-increasing benefits through reciprocal Lend-Lease, notably for its troops abroad,¹ it remains the major producer of weapons, material and food for the United Nations. Its factories and farms are among those safest from enemy attacks. Moreover, the United States has now the highest production rate among the Allies. That demonstrates the success of its industrial and agricultural effort. Until last spring, Great Britain was producing more armaments than the United States, including almost all of the arms for the British Isles alone, and for eighteen months the Soviet armies have been chiefly supplied with Russian-made weapons.

The United States Administration itself has always made clear that the sacrifices endured by the Allies in their common fight cannot be "measured in figures." The battles in Western Europe, on the high seas (which for so long the British Navy protected almost single-handed against the Axis), in Russia and in China, as well as in other parts of the Asiatic and African continents, have dealt telling blows upon the

¹On May 1, 1943, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, stated that the total Lend-Lease Aid up to April 1, 1943 amounted in value to \$10,319,518,000.00. He added that the effort of the U. S. had been accompanied by similar efforts of its Allies. Canada has provided \$1,000,000,000 worth of supplies to its Allies without payment and started on its second \$1,000,000,000 Aid program. Great Britain has provided the Soviet Union with comparable amounts of Lend-Lease Aid and is also helping China and the forces of the governments-in-exile. The United Kingdom is also providing large and increasing amounts of reverse Lend-Lease to United States forces. Almost all the food for American forces in Australia and New Zealand is being provided through Lend-Lease by those countries, and a great variety of other supplies and services is being furnished to American troops which are moving overseas in increasing numbers.

enemy. The Russian armies alone have taken a higher toll of the Germans than have all of the other Allies put together.

But the full weight of American armies and of American production, added to the gigantic effort of her Allies, will seal the fate of the Axis Powers and their satellites. The strategy of Lend-Lease, as it was established before Pearl Harbor, outlined the similar total and fraternal cooperation of today on the battle-fields. Lend-Lease supplies in the hands of the other United Nations, as Mr. Edward R. Stettinius put it in his report of January 1943 to the Congress of the United States, serve the war effort of the United States. "When a General Sherman tank smashes through an Axis emplacement, the enemy is hurt just as much, whether the action is before Stalingrad or on the Axis flanks in Libya and Tunisia. An American-made fighter plane strikes effectively in the cause of the United Nations whether it is strafing the Japanese in occupied China or the Nazis in occupied France.

"American steel shaped by British machine tools into pounder guns at a factory in the English Midlands adds to the total fire power of the armies fighting the Axis. The same is true of American tools machining Indian steel into shells in a factory in the Central Provinces of India.

"American foods shipped abroad bring the day of victory closer by providing the calories necessary to sustain the energy and strength of those fighting our enemies, whether it be a Soviet soldier from Tiflis

pushing forward against the Nazis through snow and ice—or a dockyard worker who went through the London blitz and is now unloading supplies for United States forces in Britain—or a British mother whose children are entrusted to a day nursery while she takes a man's place at a lathe in a shell-making plant."¹

The Lend-Lease Act, as the first effort of the United States in rendering material assistance to the Allied cause, has developed into the most enlightened system of mutual aid among friendly nations.

OTHER COLLABORATION

Additional agreements for increasing production of all sorts in the free countries have been concluded, notably between the United States and Latin-America.² Such agreements cover the whole range of various raw materials produced in the countries south of the Rio Grande. The system of inter-American co-operation in addition is undergoing incessant development during the war itself.³

¹REPORT TO THE 78th CONGRESS ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS, p. 9-10.

²For the role of Board of Economic Warfare and of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, see *The United Nations; What They Are, What They May Become*, Part I. Chap. IV. World Citizens Association, Chicago, 1942.

³Among the international bodies concerned with the war, the following are especially connected with inter-American cooperation:

Inter-American Commission for Territorial Administration, Washington, D. C.

Inter-American Defense Board, Washington, D. C.

Inter-American Development Commission, Washington, D. C.

Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, Washington, D. C.

Inter-American Juridicial Committee, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Inter-American Maritime Technical Commission, Washington, D. C.

Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, Washington and Mexico.

Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, Washington, D. C.

All sorts of contacts and committees are also maintained between the European governments, especially in London and in Washington.¹

There is now a United Nations Information Office located in New York. It is directed by a controlling committee called The United Nations Information Board on which nineteen of the United Nations are represented, including Free Denmark and Fighting France. The Board is presided over by the representative of the United States Government. The Staff is composed of officials of different nationalities appointed by the Board. Membership on the Board and participation in the activities of the Office are open to all United Nations. The Board publishes a monthly Review, *The United Nations Review*, containing statements, communiques, addresses, texts of treaties and agreements and other documents concerning the United Nations.

Great Britain and the United States have jointly organized scientific research. The Office of Scientific Research and Development in Washington and the corresponding scientific organizations in Great Britain maintain the closest contact. Scientists and laboratories in the two countries have pooled their resources and inventions and have put pure, as well as applied science at the service of the United Nations. There is also intensive research in Russia. It is to be hoped that an increasingly greater appeal will be made to

¹See *The United Nations, What They Are, What They May Become*. Part I

the scientists of other United Nations, so many of whom now reside in the United States, Great Britain and other parts of the Free World. Many constructive changes of tomorrow will be due to the research conducted today for the purpose of improving deadly weapons. Progress of techniques of all sorts will make a better life for men if there is confident cooperation between them.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES—
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

Additional developments, increasingly important, are anticipated. Some of them will come as a result of the technical conference convoked by the United States Government at Hot Springs on May 18, for the purpose of examining some important problems of tomorrow:—(1) Postwar plans and prospects of various countries in the production, importing or exporting of surplus foodstuffs and other essential agricultural products;¹ (2) possibilities of international agreements and institutions to promote efficient production in that field; (3) commercial, financial, and other arrangements which international collaboration in these matters will make necessary; (4) coordination and stimu-

¹Such a work was partially prepared by the Washington Wheat Meeting which has met since July 10, 1941. The participating governments are Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. They approved on June 27, 1942 a memorandum of agreement which provides for the convening by the United States later on of a conference of all the nations having a substantial interest in wheat. A rough draft of convention has been prepared which would be submitted to the consumer as well as to the producer nations.

lation of national policies for the improvement of nutrition and for the increase of consumption in general.

The exchange of views on such matters, interesting and important as they may have been in themselves, must entail practical measures of organization. No one of the questions which have been examined is entirely new, though the war and its requirements make them appear in a new light. Such problems have been extensively studied in the past by the League of Nations.¹

The conference rightly realized that in order to prepare efficiently for the future, an interim committee would have to be created which would be able to report to the United Nations later on.² The Conference had the merit of establishing the principles by which a long-range enterprise of collective cooperation and expansion of production can be carried out in matters of food and agriculture. In order to accomplish such an enterprise, the Conference asked that a special agency be created in the future, and provided for the detailed preparation in the meantime.

INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION OF CURRENCIES

There is another problem which has preoccupied various governments and especially those of the United

¹See—Final Report of the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations on The Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture and Economic Policy, 327 pgs. League of Nations Publications II Economic and Financial 1937 II A. 10.

²Invitations to attend the Food Conference have been addressed to 45 nations, all the United Nations and the countries which have broken off relations with the Axis, called Associated Nations. France and the whole of the French Empire was represented by a delegation headed by an appointee of General de Gaulle.

States and Great Britain in the last few months. That is the stabilization of currencies after the war is over. There will be practically no money left in Asia and in Europe after the downfall of the Axis. Experience in North Africa proves that measures concerning monetary problems will have to be taken as soon as new territories are liberated. That will be vital not only for the free nations of today and their governments, but also for the Administrations which come into power in other countries. To restore the various economies, they will need currencies having a stable relationship to the dollar and freely interchangeable at stable rates.

Experience of the past proves also that such a stability must be preserved at all costs. If there is one field in which international collaboration must produce the reduction of the sovereign rights of the states it is in monetary matters. The whole question of foreign exchanges, redistribution of gold and securities, loans and credits, as well as extension of trade, will depend on the creation of a new and strong system of international cooperation in the financial field.

On April 6 and 7, 1943, the United States and British Treasuries released almost simultaneously the two postwar currency stabilization plans they have proposed. Those plans constitute a basis for discussion and agreement by all the United Nations.

There are differences of approach between the two documents, many of which come from differences in the present situation of the two countries in their fi-

nancial status, their gold reserves, and their past and prospective trade activities. Hence, divergent proposals result as to the role of gold in the future, and the determining of the responsibilities of each participating nation in the management of the International Agency to be created.

Basically, however, and in their purpose, the two plans are close, and present common and promising features. a) Both recognize the necessity of breaking away from the practices of the past in which the debtor countries depended on the good will of the creditor nations, or had to take recourse in the devaluation of currencies and other expedients fatal to world trade. b) After the war, an increased exchange of goods must be ensured between nations if there is to be prosperity on this earth. As a preliminary condition to the adoption of a sound international economic policy, it is agreed by the two Treasuries that an international stabilization of currencies is necessary, and that it must be obtained through the creation of a United Nations machinery. c) Instead of the prewar system of bilateral or multilateral agreements, a new and orderly method would be adopted to allow the Treasuries and Central Banks of all member States to collaborate through an international clearing house in settling their exchange balances with each other by means of an international currency unit. d) Both plans are completely international in character and scope. Which-ever method of ensuring a satisfactory representation

of the participating countries may be accepted after discussion, each of those nations would have a share in the management of the future United Nations Agency. Each of them would have a voting power according to an accepted plan. e) In exchange for the advantages from such international cooperation, the participating countries must accept definite obligations. They would have to obtain the consent of the United Nations Agency before taking any steps concerning their currencies which would affect the interest of other members. They might be requested in certain cases, to adopt appropriate internal measures for the purpose of remedying their financial situation if it should depart from the necessary equilibrium in one way or another.

Such principles are sound. They have led the authors of the two plans to outline constructive programs which anticipate the creation of a United Nations Agency such as has never before existed.

Such an arrangement will make possible the granting of short-term credits to impoverished nations in an orderly fashion. These credits will be necessary in helping them to rebuild their ruined economies at a time when their imports will necessarily be greater than their exports.

But the urgent needs of economic reconstruction will call for the granting of long-term credits also. Such a requirement will soon become acute. The experience in the last postwar period proved that sound economic

conditions should be closely connected with the lending of money. Here again, bilateral agreements would not work any better than they did after the last war. It is to be foreseen that new developments will be necessary to ensure a healthy cooperation of the United Nations in the financial field. They should anticipate the establishment of a United Nations Bank.

Behind the technicalities which separate the two plans, there are, it is true, difficulties of a political nature which relate to the respective roles that Great Britain and the United States will play in financial matters after the war; other obstacles of similar nature will have to be removed so as to give to other nations the guarantees they need. Such difficulties will have to be straightened out in the course of the discussions taking place with the other United Nations and when their collaboration in financial matters will become a part of their larger cooperation in a political setup.

In the various fields reviewed above, many of the measures thus taken, or to be taken in the near future, are of vital interest not only to the United Nations, but also to friendly nations such as the Latin-American Republics which have broken relations with the Axis. We must also keep in mind the situation in which the presence of the governments-in-exile, and of the authorities in command of the free fighting forces recall, namely, that hundreds of millions of human beings are as much interested in such measures as are the unconquered

nations fighting the Axis.¹ Action by the United Nations is even now of worldwide importance.

¹ The tragic problem of refugees which is becoming increasingly acute as a result of drastic Nazi persecution, and constitutes an urgent concern for the United States was given consideration at a Conference of the United States and Great Britain which took place in Bermuda on April 19, 1943. The policy and the practical measures to be applied by the United Nations in such an important and pressing matter remains, however, to be determined.

It is to be recalled in this connection that an Inter-Governmental Committee on Political Refugees functions in London. It was created before the war as a result of the International Conference which met at Evian in 1938 on the initiative of President Roosevelt. Thirty-two governments are represented on the Committee which, following the insistence of the United States and other participating governments, was maintained after the outbreak of hostilities.

CHAPTER VIII

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE WAR AND IN TIME OF PEACE

SOME PRINCIPLES OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION

THE fact that such integration as that already developing between the United Nations will have to be maintained in the future does not also imply that methods found adequate in time of war will fulfill the needs of peace.

1. International collaboration in time of war, which means United Nations collaboration, is of necessity restricted to a system of agreements between governmental representatives and officials.

In fact, the Executives of every country now enjoy exceptional powers within the framework of their respective national constitutions. They are empowered to deal with all problems referring directly to the conduct of the war. They can take direct action on important measures of organization. The Departments concerned with war within the various Administrations have themselves much power of initiative and broad responsibilities. Sometimes, as in Great Britain,

a small war cabinet helps the Prime Minister make quick and definite decisions. The governments-in-exile are separated from their countries, and their parliaments have been dissolved. Even though they have sometimes set up representative councils to support them, such bodies are, for all practical purposes, of an advisory nature. Responsibility for international agreements remains entirely with the governments themselves, though they know that later on their liberated people will have to make their voices heard, and though they keep in close contact with the resistance movements through underground connections. They must limit their action insofar as regards protection of national interests to the most immediate and essential needs.

Such wartime conditions do not permit the solution of the fundamental issues which will subsequently be at stake concerning the organization of international cooperation during peace. They do not permit decisions as to what powers will be granted to the directing councils and common bodies of the United Nations, either regionally or universally. Such decisions can be taken by governments only after lengthy negotiations, and with the approval of their Parliaments.

2. Another question to be considered in relation to the extension of governmental responsibilities in time of war is shown in the structure of the combined bodies created for the purpose of dealing with problems of industrial preparedness, distribution of weapons, and

transportation. It is not only that such bodies are composed exclusively of representatives of the administrations which have assumed major responsibility. In addition, the officials of their secretariats are directly appointed by their respective governments. They are, for the most part, responsible to those governments only, and are still connected with their own administrative departments.

It is obvious that United Nations bodies will be organized in the future and that they will be of a different pattern. From this point of view, the future international organization under the United Nations must not be less homogeneous and international than was the League of Nations. The executive branches of all councils which will exist in the future will be composed of United Nations officials, appointed, on the proposal of the directors of those agencies or of a special appointing committee, by the governing body of the agency itself, not by individual governments.

Experience has proved that it is impossible to constitute international bodies of officials by juxtaposition of a series of little national groups working together. It is by integration into a single body of competent people of different nationalities who are loyal to the ideal of international and democratic cooperation, that efficient United Nations administrative bodies will be created and organized. The advance of international administration from the stage of collaboration between separate national groups, to the stage of col-

laboration by the fusion of these groups, will be one of the problems which will have to be gradually but completely settled when circumstances permit.

A first opportunity will arise during the war when the executive branch of the United Nations Relief Organization will be created. Such opportunities will multiply themselves in various fields of specialized cooperation. There is no hope, however, of solving the problem completely, in the political field especially, until new bodies which are endowed with real powers to direct international cooperation in the future, are set up. Such bodies will be organized only after peace is re-established, even though present war collaboration prepares the way for them.

3. There is another characteristic feature of United Nations collaboration in time of war,—namely, its very natural failure to include in a systematized and organized way the whole field of normal relations between the participating powers. Many of the activities of a nation which, in time of peace, give opportunity for fruitful collaborations, do not now exist in the field of organized cooperation. They are left in each country to the care of national departments or organizations which enter into negotiations with foreign nations when necessary. Even if international bodies were created in the prewar period to take care of such concerns, as were many of the component parts of the League of Nations, they cannot carry on now the same activities as they did in the past. Some of the interna-

tional problems which have thus to be neglected in time of war will loom large in the future. Many instances could be cited, as for example in the fields of health as well as social, moral, intellectual, and educational activities. United Nations collaboration will expand immensely when peace comes.

READJUSTMENTS FOR PEACETIME COLLABORATION

It is to be foreseen that two considerations will guide the authorities of the United Nations when the war is over: (a) the obvious advantage of making as full use as possible of the very efficient existing war machinery; (b) the necessity of transforming and readjusting it to the needs of peace. In their membership as well as in their administrative functioning, the United Nations bodies of the war will first undergo progressive transformations. They will have to represent more fully the United Nations.

But, above all, they will be placed at the disposal of councils or governing bodies which, even though set up before the end of the war, will go through gradual change as the people of all the United Nations become able to decide on what sacrifices they will make for peace. They will then be in a position to appoint their representatives to United Nations gatherings. Real and complete discussions within nations, as well as those among United Nations will take place on the subject of the collaboration in the peace to come.

There will be debated then such vital questions as

those involving what powers shall be given, both regional and universal, to the delegates of the countries participating in the common effort of reorganization. Even if new Federal States appear in some parts of the world, it will have to be decided whether the United Nations will remain only an Association of Nations or groups of Nations sending government delegates to common gatherings, or whether they will decide to try a first application of the federal principle by surrendering some of their sovereign rights to the new World Agencies.

The war machinery of the United Nations will have to be integrated into the new framework to be created. Similar measures will have to be taken to adjust the activities of the United Nations machineries existing at the end of hostilities in various areas of the world to the new regional structures which may be established.

But there is another essential principle of international organization which will have to be strictly applied in that respect, namely, that regionalism must be a complement and a component part of universalism. European, Asiatic, Pacific, American councils, or whatever less extensive but multilateral groups that can exist, will have to be legally connected with a world system in order to be integral parts of such a system. Many questions, essential to peaceful political relations between nations must be dealt with in the framework of universal cooperation. Military security will remain the concern of all the United Nations, even

after regional machineries have been set up, in order to take care of the immediate policing of given areas. It will be part of the responsibility of the world system to deal with the production of, and access to, raw materials, many problems relating to international trade, collaboration in intellectual matters, and other universal interests. A primary concern of all will be the protection of human rights, which is essential if the world is to be homogeneous enough not to develop into hostile blocs. There will again be a World Court.

THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

It stands to reason that there would be a distinct advantage in having provisional political machinery in advance so that adequate consideration could be given now to such vital and complicated questions, thus making their eventual solution infinitely more simple when the time comes.

The fact that several United Nations conferences are contemplated for the near future is a most encouraging sign. Out of them should progressively appear a solution of many technical matters and the nucleus of a United Nations organization able to deal with essential questions of reconstruction.

But the same evolution should prevail in the political field. For the conduct of the war itself, the only reasonable hope is to see a Supreme Council emerge, directing a constantly increasing unification of strategy,

when the band of the Allied armies tightens about Axis lands.

And the example of the Pacific War Council which functions in Washington under the chairmanship of President Roosevelt, is a first proof that even in time of war the outline of the United Nations collaboration in political matters could exist.

The problem of organizing a political structure strong enough to protect the patient building up of peace will come first at the end of hostilities. At the same time, questions of frontiers, of sovereignty over a number of territories in Europe and in Asia, of relationships between neighboring nations desiring to live in closer collaboration, and of re-establishing national governments will be presented simultaneously. Many of these problems, already acute today, will be still more dangerous if nothing is done beforehand to handle them as quickly and effectively as possible. It is also dangerous thinking to assume that their solution can be left to the decisions of a Supreme Council representing only a few powerful nations. The United Nations must act as one unit not only in the solution of political difficulties but also in regard to the fundamental problems of international organization.

The lengthy negotiations which have preceded the creation of a United Nations Relief Agency are proof that improvisation is impossible in such matters and that many obstacles of various kinds have to be overcome.

Moreover, in spite of the widespread desire to avoid, while the war is going on, political issues involving acute national rivalries, there have already arisen conflicts between various United Nations. The most striking, but not the only example of this was recently afforded in the severance of relations between the Russian Government and the Polish Government-in-Exile.

It is indeed paradoxical that such situations can suddenly develop among the United Nations without any opportunity having previously been given to them to offer friendly mediation to the disagreeing countries. The regular relations between United Nations governments should not merely be those conducted through the traditional channels of diplomacy. It should not be possible to have complete diplomatic breaks between Allied countries in time of war. Likewise, experience has proved that many delicate questions of a political nature can be discussed in a much more friendly atmosphere when not left entirely to negotiations between the most interested parties.

In the field of future international organization, the greatest obstacle to harmonious political collaboration among the United Nations would be a misunderstanding as to ways of recognizing various degrees of responsibility which they now have and will continue to have in world affairs. Agreement must also be secured in advance on that point. Discontent and distrust as to the respective role of the various United Nations, large or small, European or Asiatic, would

endanger and perhaps wreck the whole structure of their combination.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that all of the meetings of the United Nations in the near future will not be merely of a technical and specialized nature. There should be an additional meeting, before long, which would create a Political Council of the United Nations.

FUNCTIONING OF A UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL IN TIME OF WAR

It is very clear that proposals as to the functioning and duties of the Political Council should be made in advance of the meeting. Such a plan should first be formulated by some of the United Nations—those most qualified to take the initiative in such a matter. It could easily be agreed that the Council could not, for the time being, deal with such matters as strategy and the conduct of the war. Such a body, however, should be kept fully informed of the general policy being followed by the United Nations and would, therefore, be in a position to give invaluable support to such a policy. The United Nations Council would, in fact, be the symbol and the expression of the solidarity uniting the Allies. Its first duty would be to prevent such solidarity from diminishing through avoiding political disputes. Even when such disputes arise which cannot be settled at this time, the Council could prepare ways for their friendly settlement at some later time. It could

also propose or prepare the broad outlines of the solutions to be given after the war to many political problems existing in various parts of the world.

The Political Council would also be entitled to approve of all the work of cooperation in specialized fields being carried on by the United Nations. The enterprises already being conducted in such matters as relief, refugees, reconstruction and postwar finance would be performed with far greater harmony within a provisional framework binding those activities together.

But there is another essential function of the United Nations which would thus be ensured, that of organizing on a durable basis their mutual relationships and of recognizing their respective responsibilities in the struggle for victory, as well as in the re-establishment of international life later on.

Preliminary negotiations as to the creation of a United Nations Council should bring about a first measure of settlement of the problem. In addition to the plenary meetings of the Political Council, there should be no difficulty in having subdivisions which deal with Asiatic, European, or other regional questions. Countries with worldwide interests would naturally have a seat in each one of the Council divisions; others in several of them; while some would take part only in the sessions where problems in which they are interested would be dealt with.¹

¹See *The United Nations; What They Are, What They May Become*, Part II.

A first nucleus of the United Nations Executive Branch could then be created for the purpose of preparing, under the authority of the President of the Council, the various sessions to be held, and the execution of the decisions thus made.

The machinery of collaboration thus established would also have to give consideration to the best ways of re-integrating the liberated countries into the United Nations group, and of recreating an indispensable unity between the various parts of the Free World of Tomorrow. In Europe, as in Asia, problems relating to this question will constantly arise after victory. They will have to be discussed with the interested peoples and their representatives. It is important to be as well prepared as possible to meet such difficulties.

CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE POLITICAL COUNCIL, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

Many of the developments which will mark the difference between the United Nations collaboration in time of war and in peace would undoubtedly have to be introduced later on, into the functioning of the Political Council of the United Nations.

It would very likely be placed at first under the chairmanship of the President of the United States, as was the Pacific War Council. Later on, the question of its chairmanship would have to be solved according to the nature of the collaboration which the United Nations will develop among themselves.

If the chairmanship of the Supreme Political Council should remain in the hands of the representative of an individual government, that would entail a system of rotation—at comparatively short intervals—as in the Council of the League of Nations.

The granting of powers of decision in certain matters pertaining to security and economics to the national representatives in the world assembly would, on the contrary, make possible the election of a Chairman of the World Agency for a given, and much longer period, as would be the case now, in time of war.

Such developments are impossible to foresee at this present time. It is to be hoped, however, that such will be the trend of the future. Emergencies will not disappear with victory. And without believing that the United Nations could establish a full-fledged world government immediately after the war, they should at least be able to entrust the direction of their mutual and worldwide concerns to a common body in which all of them would participate. Such a body should not be a simple diplomatic gathering but should be composed of representatives having definite powers and functions, and able to choose the statesman who would preside over their work, as well as select their other officers and officials.

CONCLUSION

WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

INTERNATIONAL organization is one of the most difficult tasks which ever confronted humanity. It failed once, and must not fail again. Under the blows of a ruthless enemy, the United Nations are taking now bold steps towards collective cooperation. They are demonstrating that, if the same spirit endures after victory, they will be able to translate their community of faith and purpose into means for common action.

Out of this wartime cooperation definite outlines and important parts of the future world organization are already emerging. The principal ones, briefly, are these:

1. The military cooperation which now exists on the battlefields is furnishing the pattern and basis for a future system of collective security, but one which will be, of course, on a much less costly scale. Essential features of such a system would be: a general staff of the United Nations; an international police force; and the control of strategic bases by the United Nations which would allow them to keep open the sea lanes when collective action became necessary. The tremendous development in air transportation during this war should also lead to international organization in civilian aviation.

2. In economic matters, the Lend-Lease Act has lead

to the establishment of entirely new principles for the future in the expansion of production and exchange of goods. Those principles are included in the Master Lend-Lease Agreements which were concluded by the United States and other United Nations.¹ Such agreements depart completely from the prewar practices of financial and economic nationalism. They outline the program for a United Nations Agency in international trade and render its establishment necessary. Lend-Lease activities have already resulted in the development of an intricate system throughout the free world of mutual help and assistance in economic matters.

3. In London and Washington there now exist combined Boards which are entrusted with the tasks of increasing production and of ensuring the distribution of raw materials of all kinds, food and implements of war among the United Nations. They also regulate shipping. Those various bodies, properly expanded, will furnish an experienced machinery which the United Nations will have at their disposal when peace comes.

4. Steps are being taken to create an interim machinery which will prepare for the further solution, through international cooperation, of problems involved in the expansion of agriculture and the production of food.

5. Measures for the international stabilization of

¹See *The United Nations, What They Are, What They May Become*, Part I, Chap. III, and Part II, Chap. VI p. 65 ff.

currencies are being studied. The execution of such projects would start a new period in international banking and finance.

6. The thorough work of preparation now being conducted in the field of relief will lead to the creation of a United Nations Agency having a far-reaching influence upon the rehabilitation of war-shattered world economy.

7. Combined organizations for relief and for the production and distribution of raw materials and civilian supplies have already been, or will be, created in various areas of the world. They foreshadow the extent to which a well-conceived international organization, supported by sound regional decentralization, will develop in the future.

8. Those various activities will bring about during the war itself, further measures of United Nations collaboration in various other fields, such as health, nutrition, and transportation. Various other parts of inter-Allied cooperation are already in existence in the fields of information and scientific research, for example.

9. War has accelerated the pace of inter-American cooperation in many respects. The governments-in-exile have also created, either for all of them or for several, new procedures and bodies to prepare the solution of various economic and other problems which will confront their peoples in the future.

10. Plans have been made by the International

Labor Office,¹ as a result of the International Labor Conference held in New York, October-November, 1941, to cope with social problems during and after the rehabilitation period.

11. Although the progress in organization is slower in the political field than in others, there is increasing realization that closer political understanding must exist among the United Nations before the war ends. The need for such complete solidarity has been demonstrated by the various difficulties which have arisen from time to time. That understanding should lead to the creation of a first nucleus in the political machinery of the future.

The leaders of the United Nations have never forgotten, and rightly, that military demands come first, and that nothing must be attempted which might delay the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. The policy of experimental organization which they have followed has nevertheless yielded far-reaching results. The pressure of the global war itself has made, and will continue to make necessary, permanent combinations for common endeavor.

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

The Democracies, attacked by forces with superior striking power, will gain once more, as they did in 1918, the final, decisive victory. Stalingrad, Tunis and Bizerte tolled the knell of the Axis. This same re-

¹See *The United Nations on the Way*, Chap. VI.

sult will have been attained for the second time, not only because of the steadily increasing concentration of resources and vast numbers of avenging soldiers, but because of the constant determination of all free men and peoples to preserve the rights and the heritage of ideas which their forefathers passed on to them.

After having borne the cross of war twice in one quarter of a century, the United Nations must understand and guard the lesson which is contained in their sufferings and triumph.

The war will have been won in the name of freedom as opposed to a recourse through despair to a system of despotism for the solution of the complex problems of our era. It will have saved the moral and intellectual values which are the real claims to glory of modern civilization, and will have justified the confidence in Man which the Fascists and Nazis alone have lost.

But these values are dynamic values. In order to prevent the return of these catastrophes which have twice loosed destruction on the world, the United Nations must continue to turn to new formulas. These formulas must assert that the distrust resulting from the spirit of political nationalism which the war—for a time at least—will have intensified, is no longer justified. They must also assert that the appeals to fear and despair which the many social problems have created are no longer to be heeded. They must eliminate these two dangers which were so effectively exploited by Hitler in his preparation for conquest.

The lessons of the 19th Century and of the First World War prove also that the application of past methods will not be enough.

This is not a Great Alliance of a few powerful nations which tomorrow will control the world—continents or parts of continents. Any combination of Powers not enjoying the full support and trust of all the peoples finally freed from fear, and which possess only greater physical strength, would not even last as long as those after the Napoleonic wars. At that time, the world was simpler. It did not have the same population and social problems. Distances made it still possible to localize conflicts, and still protected continents.

There likewise cannot be a return to the patchwork pattern of nations refusing to recognize their patent interdependence. Their mutual ties must be closer than after the last war, strong enough to retain the unity of plan and action which will have made victory possible.

The most important lesson of the war—and of the past—is that the strong bonds forged during the hours of gravest danger, and between peoples who have never before attained so high a degree of cooperation, must not be destroyed. All those peoples must enjoy the benefits of that collaboration, including those who, though vanquished yesterday, made possible tomorrow's victory through their initial sacrifices and will join again the Allied armies in the final battles.

The formula for the United Nations is flexible

enough to allow full recognition of the role to be played by each country according to the importance of its contribution. This role must be assumed, however, in full and constant agreement and cooperation with the other United Nations. All of them will have to be responsible for the effective protection of the political peace, necessary for completing the long and difficult task of international organization.

Moreover, new groupings of peoples, and new federations will be necessary in many cases in order to avoid the disputes over sovereignty and frontiers which have been a constant source of war. New types of economic integration will have to prevail in several regions of the world. These closer unions, whether involving the countries of the Near East, Southern Asia, Western Europe, or Central Europe, will be determined by political and spiritual ties, or by common interests. They cannot be imposed from without.

They must, however, be integrated into a harmonious whole. The United Nations will have to weld together unceasingly, and enlarge the present means of collaboration, incorporating therein, when the time comes, the independent and widely distributed forms of international cooperation which were created during the interim of the two World Wars. They must organize their unity definitely, as well as their central authority, thus assuring the necessary evolution towards new and solid bases for world cooperation. The conditions will thus be created for working out the

implementation of the terms of the Four Freedoms and of the Atlantic Charter. Those promises must not fall short of continuous dynamic realization, if there is to be some prospect, after the ordeal, of a turn in history such as those symbolized by the Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence of the American Colonies, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French Revolution.

Appendix III

Aims and Organization of the World Citizens Association

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

ANITA McCORMICK BLAINE, *Acting Chairman*

QUINCY WRIGHT, *Secretary*

EDWIN H. CASSELS, *Treasurer*

FRANK AYDELOTTE

CHARLES C. BURLINGHAM

JOSEPH E. DAVIES

EDWIN R. EMBREE

PAUL U. KELLOGG

ADLAI STEVENSON

HENRY W. TOLL

RAY LYMAN WILBUR

HENRI BONNET, *Special Adviser*¹

EXTRACTS FROM THE BY-LAWS

of the World Citizens Association

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the World Citizens Association shall be:

1. To develop the world community's awareness of itself so that eventually a world order may be evolved in which races, nations and cultural associations may be harmonized, thus reducing strife without eliminating variety;

¹Director of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. Member of the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva from its inception in 1920 until 1931. Secretary-General of the International Studies Conference. Was Vice-President of the Studies Center of Foreign Politics in Paris. Professor at the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes, New York. Was appointed in 1943 to membership in The French Committee of National Liberation, as Commissioner of Information, Algeria.

2. To cultivate by all means in its power the habit of looking at problems from the world point of view;
3. As a means to these ends to promote objective studies of world problems and to disseminate information upon such subjects;
4. To cooperate in all practicable ways with those persons and institutions whose objects are in harmony with the purpose of this organization.

II. MEMBERSHIP

1. Persons interested in these purposes may become members on payment of dues of \$1.00 annually.
 2. All members shall receive such literature and information as the Central Committee provides for general distribution.
- Local committees may be organized, with the consent of the Central Committee, to promote the purpose herein stated.

A PLATFORM FOR WORLD CITIZENSHIP

Adopted December 9, 1939

ONE

In the modern world the security and prosperity of all individuals and all groups are closely bound together. The preservation of civilization depends upon the ability of national states and diverse peoples to live together happily and successfully in this rapidly shrinking world. Since all individuals today suffer or benefit by conditions the world over, every man has interests and responsibilities as a world citizen.

Two

There is no essential conflict between world citizenship and national citizenship any more than there has always been between loyalty to local communities and allegiance to larger units of state

or nation or confederation. In each case there is simply the problem of organizing the larger state so that it will give the greatest security and freest scope to the smaller communities and to the individuals for whose well-being all governments are established.

THREE

The organization of world authority will probably proceed haltingly and unevenly. Any of a number of possible world organizations may be set up tentatively or permanently. Whatever the ultimate administration and however swiftly or slowly the organization of the world proceeds, certain principles are essential.

FOUR

World organization must guarantee to all individuals security within the common, basic laws, and the essential rights of life, liberty, free speech, and free cultural expression. National states as well as smaller political units will continue to promote the interests and rights of their nationals, to maintain justice and order within the national domain, and to contribute to world civilization by manifestations of the national genius in science, literature, the arts, and economic and political organization.

FIVE

National states must be subordinate to world civilization; their jurisdiction must be limited by world law, and any local legislation contrary to world law must be null and void.

SIX

National states must not be allowed to resort to violence except for the enforcement of law and order within the national jurisdiction and for the assistance of world police in maintaining law and order throughout the world.

SEVEN

World institutions may be expected to develop directly or indirectly from existing international institutions. These have begun

to build up international legislative authorities based upon an appropriate representation of population and existing political units, international judicial authorities competent to entertain actions by individuals and political units for the interpretation and application of international law, and international executive authorities competent to administer international law and to maintain order among states. World law may be expected to develop from existing international law by continuing a proper balance between the concepts of the rights of individuals and groups and the interdependence of individuals and groups.

EIGHT

In addition to the maintenance of law and order, world institutions may supervise the world services which are growing with increasing rapidity: the international postal union, international control of disease, study and regulation of labor conditions, the curbing of such world evils as the traffic in women and drugs, the stabilizing of world finance, the better organization of commerce, world communications, and the pursuit of science and scholarship.

NINE

World institutions need not curtail diversity in religion, customs and special talents. With removal of the threat of violence and repression by intolerant neighbors, individual and group genius will have opportunity to flower as never before.

TEN

ALL members of the human race and all existing political units must have status under world law and be able to invoke appropriate world institutions for the protection of their rights.

